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table of
contents

articles

Power and History in the Serbs: Historiography after 1990 Sevba Abdula	7
Ibtidaiye Mektebs in the Kaza of Gjilan According to the Ottoman Sources During 1900-190 Agron Islami, Sefedin Rahimi	47
The European Union's Political Membership Criteria and Their Effects on Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina Danijela Dudley, Fleurine Saez	73
War Memorials and their Impact on Reconciliation: Vukovar as a Case Study Blerta Ahmeti	93

book reviews

Useful Enemies: Islam and The Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450-1750 Omer Merzić	109
Gjykimi i Papërfunduar i Sllobodan Millosheviçit Semran Murtezani, Ardita Ilazi	113
To Be a Qadi in Cristian Empire: The Work and Staff of Sharia Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina Between 1878-1914 Dženita Sarač-Rujanac	117
Trajtësimi i identiteteve kombëtare bullgare dhe serbe: 1800-1900 Ali Pajaziti	127

articles

Power and History in the Serbs: Historiography after 1990*

Sevba Abdula

Abstract: This study aims to examine the processes brought forth in Serbian historiography using the structural nature of the mutually influential relationship between power and history as data. The study focuses on the post-1990 period and examines the history, institutions, major works, and historians of Serbian historiography. The period under study includes two distinct power eras: the nationalist transition and the postmodern period. The study examines the characteristics, structures, and dynamics of these periods within this framework and attempts to determine the continuity and differences between these two periods. The study analyzes the results of Serbian historiography's relationship to power and history by examining the Ottoman narrative in general works on Serbian history.

Keywords: power, history, Serbian historiography, nationalist transition period, interaction with EU period.

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Introduction

Serbian historiography has largely shaped its existence using the same themes of ideology and identity perspectives of the Serbian nation and state. In this context, Jovan Rajić's work written at the end of the 18th century can be considered the beginning of modern Serbian historiography. Since the second half of the 19th century, Serbian historiography has experienced an upsurge, and this process has also opened the door for new schools to emerge. Different historical perspectives can be stated to have emerged in Serbian historiography, both in terms of method and approach. The reasons for these are independence, constant changes in the borders of the Serbian state, migrations, ideologies, the coexistence of religious and cultural groups with different ethnicities and sects, wars, and pressure from international institutions.

Serbian historiography is area where the use of history for power and ideology collides with the scientific understanding of history. While the Romantic nationalist school, the Marxist school, and the post-Romantic nationalist school reflect historiography's entanglement with power and ideology within the positivist scientific paradigm, the Ruvarac school, the Annales school, and the post-2000 social historiography represent a postpositivist scientific paradigm. While the role of the Enlightenment and positivism had been dominant at the beginning of Serbian historiography, the Annales and the Marxist schools gained importance over time. Moreover, post-positivism began appearing in Serbian historiography within the framework of social historiography and common history studies after 2000.

Historians such as Branković, Rajić, Julinac, and Srećković are the main figures who founded the Romantic nationalist school of 18th-century Serbian historiography. Under the influence of Enlightenment thought, these historians prioritized the interests of politics and ideology using the historiography they developed by focusing on the independence, reconstruction, and national consciousness of the Serbian state (Györe, 2006: 89–108). Ruvarac's critical school had been influenced by Ranke since the second half of the 19th century and aimed to develop historical facts and data around a scientific discipline by developing a new historiographical perspective. The most distinctive features of the Ruvarac school were the criticism and rejection of traditional romantic-nationalist historiography, especially the one based on mythology and nationalistic

elements as advocated by Srećković. Together with names such as Popović, Stojaković, and Stojanović, Ruvarac developed a new approach, claiming that historical phenomenon can only be obtained from historical sources that have been thoroughly verified and studied. The Ruvarac school, whose influence on Serbian historiography has persisted through many historians, was adopted in particular by historians trained in Vienna and Germany.

The victory of the communists in World War II and the power they seized has had a lasting impact on Serbian historiography. The combination of the perspective of historical materialism and studies on economic and social development with the historiography developed through political and diplomatic history has opened the door to new excitement in this discipline. By clarifying the limits of the irredentist perspective of history that had been predominant until World War II, its influence began to wane, and the discourse on unity and brotherhood and sensitive nationalist issues began being excluded and ignored. Partisan resistance and the creation of a common historical memory by mythicizing this resistance were one of the most fundamental approaches of this period. The turbulence of the political history of socialist Yugoslavia, the foreign policy decisions, the death of Tito, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia were the main factors in the processes historiography would undergo. Although many important historians were arrested, fled the country before World War II, or died in the war, the historians who remained in the history department were silent on the issue of contemporary historiography and represented traditional Serbian historiography.

Attempts had been made at the congresses of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia since the 1960s to integrate Marxism into the historical methodology through directives aimed at Yugoslav researchers (Vucinich, 1951:41-57). Professor Branislav Djurđević at the University of Sarajevo was the one who applied this new methodology most seriously. According to Vucinich, the principles of ethnic democracy and cultural autonomy were combined during this period with Marxist materialism and national sentiments. The disagreements between Tito and Stalin led to criticism of the Soviet historical school and to the denigration of revisionism, idealism, and mysticism. By criticizing the historians of the golden age, the dynasty, the church, and the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary movements and the people were affirmed and made the central theme. An important part of the historical works published in the Tito period aimed at building the “common historical memory” of the peoples of Yugoslavia by focusing

on the partisans' struggle (Marković, Miličević, & Ković, 2004:280). The publishing market, having been shaped by the demands of the republics, should be noted to have influenced the historiography of the Tito period, as did the works of politicians such as Tito, Đilas, and Kardelj.

As the authority of social and political life, Tito's death in 1980 represents another break in Serbian historiography. Tito's death being accompanied by the global debt crisis, the domestic political crisis, and the process of disintegration triggered a great process of unrest and transformation that was to last until the 2000s. Issues came to the fore such as the end of the ideology of the Tito period, the Chetnik movement in particular being redefined in Serbian historiography, the new approach to pre-communist Yugoslavia, and the reinterpretation of Serbian losses in World War II, as well as the oppression of the communist regime and its victims and the non-academic historiographical criticism. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the involvement of Serbian historians in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, and their legitimization of the wars damaged public confidence in historiography during the 1980-2000 period. The works of Cirković and Gasević on Serbian historiography and the publications of other researchers during this period are also noteworthy. Andrej Mitrović qualified this period as "parahistoriography," by which he meant a period that imitates actual historiography but lacks the methods, criticisms, and standards of verification (Marković, Miličević, & Ković, 2004:292-293), and as the period of the "new romantic and nationalistic historiography." With the end of communism, the disappearance of official control paved the way for many books to be published.

Educated in Germany under the leadership of Andrej Mitrović, the new and younger generation began coming to the fore in Serbian historiography after 2000. With Milošević's fall from power in 2000, the effect of the Europeanization process triggered postpositivist historiography and prioritized social, economic, and cultural history studies with common bases. Through the influence of the newly founded institutes, the door was opened to a new era that sought to eliminate the effects of the traditional nationalist and communist historiography.

This study analyzes the years 1980-2000, which have been defined as the nationalist transition period, and the years post-2000, which have been defined as the postmodern period, in terms of the relationship between power and history. At the same time,

the results of this relationship will be examined in terms of general themes regarding Serbian historiography and the Ottoman historical narrative in well-known works on general Serbian history.

The New Romantic and Nationalist Historiographies: From a Communist Ethos to a National Ethos

The years 1980-2000 are undoubtedly a turning point for the history of Serbs, Yugoslavia, and the Balkans. Crises, wars, and disintegration changed areas such as politics, ideology, nation, education, economy, and international relations and also shaped the study of history with positive and negative effects. The understanding of history, in which the Marxist perspective had been extensively used during the period of socialist Yugoslavia, led to many traumas that were repressed and forgotten within social memory, something known as the culture of collective forgetting. The 1974 Constitution wanted to use traumas such as the death of Tito and the difficulties that accompanied the economic depression to construct a new identity, especially by remembering these traumas. The socialist and national ethos was replaced by themes such as myths, the history before and during World War I, heroes, saints, and Chetniks. As a result of this replacement, partisans and Chetniks were equated, people began to talk about communist oppression, many studies were published about whether Tito was a saint or a devil, questions were asked about who the Bosnians were, and studies about Kosovo increased.

According to Marković and Miličević five main themes came to the fore in Serbian historiography during the nationalist transition process: the Chetnik movement that had been discredited in the historiography of World War II was redefined, the pre-socialism period in Yugoslavia (i.e., the period before and after World War I monarchies) was again made the focus, the losses suffered in World War II were reinterpreted, and statements on the communist regime's oppression and discovery of its victims and non-academic historical studies were strongly propagated in the public opinion. The structural situation that led to the formation of this framework was the attempt socialist Yugoslavia had made to build a "common historical memory" as a country with a multinational, ethnic, religious, and sectarian population (Miličević & Marković, 2007:147). The above problems came to the fore with the dissolution of the common historical

communist consciousness after 1980 and the strengthening of the idea of the nation in the republics, as well as the deepening of national, sectarian, and ideological divisions/conflicts (e.g., Serbian/Croatian, Orthodox/Catholic, communist/nationalist), especially between Serbs and Croats. The institutional structure and historiography of socialist Yugoslavia was initially divided and disunited over the Serb-Croat problem but transformed into a totality of religious and ethnic problems, including the Bosnia and Kosovo problems. The question of whether the content historians had produced had also contributed to the background of conflicts and wars should be noted as having been an ongoing debate since the 1990s.

The revival of the revisionist/expansionist historiography and perspective led to the acquittal of many people who'd been labeled as World War II criminals, especially in previous periods, and also allowed the claim to be made that many had been victimized at that time. The harsh policies of Dragoljub Mihailović and Milan Nedić during World War II were claimed to have been ignored to protect *the brotherhood and unity of Serbs*, and no voice was claimed to have been heard about the perpetrators who had committed great injustices such as genocide. This kind of framing was particularly linked to the Serbian national identity, which views Croats as the Other, but this case largely rebounded with negative consequences for Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians. The official history studies created through the socialist regime, a memorandum written in 1987 by a group of historians from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), and the appointment of certain historians to important political positions (e.g., Vesilije Krestić & Milorad Ekmecić became advisors to the President of the Republic of Serbia, Radovan Karadžić), the privatization of publishing, and history publishing in particular led to the beginning of the period that became known as parahistoriography and to viewing the study of "so-called official history as a discipline that praised the regime and shook confidence in the field. This view largely persisted until around 2005.

The political and economic problems caused by the disintegration and the war between 1980-2000 also confronted historical research with the problem of resources. Academic historiography was unable to respond to the negative nationalistic historiography that had developed through popular historiography. The younger generation of academic historiographers tried to survive through projects supported by Soros and the international community in particular, but they preferred not to research many topics from recent history. Serbian historiography was unable to develop its strong historical meth-

odology, theory, and approach within the framework of the historians who'd remained in Serbia and those who'd tried to survive abroad (Nielsen, 2020:92).

Although the League of Communists of Yugoslavia decided at its 13th Congress to promote common historical studies, historians were faced with three basic choices: focus on the common socialist history, on the common Yugoslav history, or on studying the past state and national origins of the republics. The party insisted on the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia and appointed Dušan Bilandžić, Janko Pleterski, and Branko Petranović as commission members. In the 1980s, these historians attempted to develop a historical perspective through national debates, and discussions ensued on fundamental issues such as the Chetnik movement, national historiography, and the events of World War II. For example, Durić's (1985) *Saveznici i Jugoslovenska Ratna Drama* portrayed the Chetniks as victims of British treachery and a conspiracy of Soviet spies. Also of note, the cult of Tito was gradually subjected to criticism, and publications emerged during this period. Meanwhile, the first parahistoriographical work was Dedić's *Novi Prioliz za Biografiju Josip Broz Tito*, published in three volumes between 1981-1984 (Milićević & Marković, 2007:150).

Nielsen divides post-1980 historiography into three periods: 1983-1991, 1991-1997, and 1997-2000 and notes that critical publications on Tito between 1983-1991 confirmed that, despite the emergence of the Memorandum of Serbian Historians, the majority of historians still adhered to the party-state perspective in the face of ethnic tensions. However, between 1991 and 1997 when criticism of the former communist regime and Tito became vocal, the partisan movement was equated with the Chetnik movement. In some cases, the historians denounced the partisans' actions after World War II, such as extrajudicial executions and mass reprisals.

Another important issue in this period was the genocides against Serbs committed by the *Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska* [Independent Croatian State]. 1997-2000 was a period when historians turned away from World War II-based research and focused on Kosovo and Serbian-Albanian relations. Dimitrijević focused mainly on studies of the history of occupied Serbia and concentration camps (Nielsen, 1991:93).

The influence of Marxist historiography on Balkan, Yugoslav, and Serbian historiography was limited and only occurred for a short time. With the introduction of Marxism into historiography in the world, some studies were developed on economic history,

including agriculture, peasantry, mining, trade, and urban development. However, Serbian historiography did not produce much work in the field of economic or social history, because the Marxist paradigm focused heavily on the history of the party and the history and structure of local labor movements (Milićević & Marković, 2007:154). The market for historical studies was formed for the ideological interests of local organizations such as the revolution and the party, rather than for new methods, approaches, or works on academic historiography. The nationalist transition, however, created a dichotomy in Serbian historiography due to the political environment, privatization of publishing, and international cooperation (Fleming, 2000:1227). Under the influence of civil war, economic crisis, and isolation, the first group of historians focused mainly on new methodological and thematic issues. The impact from politics, politicians, and political history caused dissatisfaction, especially among young researchers. Traditional political history studies with strong themes relatively declined, and research on social histories such as everyday life, women, urban history, minorities, and family began being published. The second group of historians continued their political history research, which was instrumentalized by politics and power to anticipate current political conditions.

Parahistoriography, which Andrej Mitrović defined as false historiography, would be created by popular historians. Popular history emerged alongside the privatization of the history market and the state no longer controlling publications and was produced by amateur historians who began to appear in the media and newspapers in opposition to academic historiography. By imitating the methods, critical approach, and verification standards of historiography without following them, these historians brought popular history publications to the forefront. In this process, every group created works showing how they'd suffered and become victims under the Yugoslav regime. The expansionist and revisionist historians who contributed to Serbian history, such as Gligrijević, Dimitrijević, Đurenović, and Pintar, can be noted to have prepared, whether consciously or unconsciously, the groundwork for the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo by denying and personalizing many crimes related to the World War II and by heroizing leaders such as Karađorđević and the Chetnik movement (Nielsen, 1991:95-96). For example, Predrag Dragić Kijuk's *Catena Mundi* was published in 2 volumes based on the victims of Serbian history; it intended to prove Serbs as the oldest local people in Europe and to prevent the spread of the Vatican's militant form of Catholicism. Like-

wise, the demand was made that many of the names that had fallen victim to the extrajudicial executions of the communist regime, especially in 1944-1945, should be retried and their rights restored. On the other hand, attempts also occurred at this time to rehabilitate even the most controversial figures in Serbian history, such as Dragoljub Mihajlović and Milan Nedić. In particular, the historians of this group claimed that the politicization of the nationalist transition historiography was effective in forming the nationalist historical consciousness of the Serbian nation and state.

The younger generation, identified by the young researchers focusing on social history, especially in academic historiography, who'd received international grants and project support to study, and research in Austria, Germany, and Hungary represents another group. Also noteworthy is the work Andrej Mitorvić (Milićević & Marković, 2007:153), one of the most important historians leading this young generation, produced in the field of theory and methodology. Mitorvić published many works during this period and focused mainly on concepts and approaches. Ranke presented studies on myths, the historical subconscious, the history of science, the three dangers of consciousness, and the famous concept of parahistoriography.

The changing institutional framework in Serbia's political, social, economic, and international relations after the period of nationalist transition also brought changes to historical institutions, journals, and other historical publications over time. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts came to the fore with the memorandum it published as the center of traditional historians or official history setting the framework for Serbian revisionist thought. After 1994, the institution focused on conferences and published their records. Its official publication was *Istoriski Casopis* and includes chapters on methodology and the history of historiography. The journal *Istoriski Glasnik* was published with contributions from Belgrade University Department of History's Faculty of Philosophy, carried out traditional historiography based on political and economic history during this period, but ceased publication in 1998 due to economic problems.

Institutions, Journals, Historians, and Featured Themes

Scientific journals such as *Istorija 20. veka* and *Tokovi Istorije* published respectively by the *Institut za Savremena Istorija* [Institute of Contemporary History] and the *Institut*

za *Noviju Istoriju Srbije* [Institute of Recent History for Serbia] are important examples of the expression of change that began during this period (Popović & Stolić, 2017:13–25; Pavlović, 2009:9–17). *The Institut za Savremena Istorija* had 35 researchers between 1989–2000, 53% of whom had been born post-1940. This institution has been rejuvenated as most of its historians retired. While 650 studies and 103 books were published by researchers during this period, most of the studies were publications from the older generation. Meanwhile, the journal *Istorija 20. Veka*, attracts attention with the 445 articles it published between 1989–2000. The journal also specified the institution's position with its special issues on important and sensitive topics such as the Spring of 1941; the local, ethnic, sectarian, and political boundaries in the history of Yugoslavia; the origins of the dissolution of Yugoslavia; and the Kosovo issue (Marković, Ković, & Milicević, 2004:287).

The Institute of Recent History for Serbia was another institution that played an important role until 1992. The Institute became an institution for social history and interdisciplinary studies and had the great advantage where 72% of its researchers had been born post-1940. Twelve researchers conducted studies on social and economic history, 11 on political history, and two on cultural history. *Tokovi Istorija*, the Institute's journal, published 330 articles in the 1990s. Of these, 50% dealt with Serbian history, 30% with Yugoslav history, and 15% with international topics. Its special issues studied the modernization of Serbia. One special issue had 24 studies, of which four dealt with women's issues. Other special issues covered World War II in 1993, Russian and Soviet history in 1995, and national minorities in 1999 (Marković, Ković, & Milicević, 2004:288).

The most valuable work in terms of the nationalist transition historiography is undoubtedly the 832-page encyclopedia by Ćirković and Mihaljić (1997) on Serbian historiography. More than 350 authors contributed to the encyclopedia, which was published in 1997; which gathered all the persons, institutions, and works related to Serbian historiography; and which revealed a very valuable study of the history of historiography. Two years after the encyclopedia's publication, the same authors made a major contribution to the field with their study on the Serbian Middle Ages titled "Leksikon Srpskog Srednjeg Veka" (Ćirković & Mihaljić, 1999). The study involved social history, cultural history, daily life, intellectual history, law, and economic history. Meanwhile, Dimić and Stanković (1996) raised the studies of Yugoslav historiography

to another level with their work (1996) on the Yugoslav historiography published between 1945 and 1964. At the same time, new editions of works by Jovanović (1990) and Corović (1989), also known as outstanding works of Serbian nationalist historiography written between the two world wars, found readers.

The church photographs that were used mainly in the new editions attracted attention. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts thus organized conferences on Novaković and Jovanović and made efforts to discover these two writers who'd developed a historical perspective on dynasty, nation, and heroes. The 10-volume *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* (1981-1993), written as a joint effort by 44 historians, covered many aspects of Serbian history up to 1918 and became one of the most fundamental works in uncovering the historiography of that period. Likewise, Ekmečić's (1989) famous work *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918* is considered one of the pioneering works in this field. Additionally, Petranović's (1988) *Istorija Jugoslavije* and Ćuretić's (1985) *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* are outstanding works on the history of Yugoslavia.

When looking at the publications from the Jugoslovenska Bibliografski Institut in the 1990s, the nation and the people are seen to be prominent in the published books instead of the themes of the party, war, and revolution. Among the 210 published studies, the presence of books dealing with the victims of World War II, the Muslim casualties, and the genocide of the partisans is noticeable. Pjanović's (1990) book *Srbi Narod Najstarije* [The Oldest People: Serbs] is also interesting.

During this period, studies were published on the Middle Ages within the framework of the medieval Serbian kingdom and its people. These publications were particularly important for reconstructing the Serbian nation and also reflected the decision to turn away from the current political history. While Kalic and Colovic had focused on settlement and urban history, Blagojević, Kalić, and Spremić dealt with Nemanjić and the Middle Ages, the rulers of the medieval Serbian Kingdom, and its administrative structure.¹ Meanwhile, the young historian Dušancić published works focusing on the political symbolism and ideology of the Middle Ages (Marković, Ković, & Miličević, 2007:298). Among the biographies, the works on Charles V, Yeğen Osman Pasha, Karađorđe Petrović, and Radoš Ljušić are also important (Samardžić, 2001; Katić, 2001; Ljušić, 1993-1995).

Studies on immigration, demography, and church history and influenced by the political context of the nationalist transition period also come to the fore. While Samardžić, Zivojinović, Ljušić, and Jagodić were interested in immigration and demographic history² Zivjinović, Dimić, Antonović, and Radić were interested in church history.³

The works on social life include Vuletić's *XIX Century Serbian Family Structure* and Mladenović's *Serbian Village in the Austro-Hungarian Occupation*. Studies on daily life were done by Mitrović and Ristović. Krestić, Ljušić, Rajić, and Stojanović focused on the party, political life, ideologies, democracy, and the political elite of contemporary Serbian life⁴. The history of modernization and gender studies also began to enter Serbian historiography⁵ Perović (1998) published "Srbija u Modernizacijskim Procesima 20. Veka," a history of modernization, while Božinović (1998) published "Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u 19th i 20th Veku" [Women's Issues in Serbia in the 19th and 20th Centuries].

Another important feature of the nationalist transition historiography is the prominence of the internationalized market, international funds, and scholarship. Financial difficulties, international isolation, historians' inability to access resources and archives, exchange programs for international projects, and donations played a key role for Serbian historians. Although the Milošević government did not like this process, the institutional and economic crisis it experienced meant that it could not sufficiently resist internationalization and money transfers, nor could it adequately support its own traditional historiography. On the other hand, it created the basis for a different historiography to develop for the first time outside of socialist Yugoslavia and beyond Milošević's rule and caused historical studies to be conducted jointly with international institutions after 2000. Between 1994-2000 especially, these opportunities that facilitated existing conditions arose with the support of historians by most of the institutions of the Soros network. Mitrović draws attention as the one who sent many young historians (e.g., Marjanović, Prelić, Spasojević, Dimitrejević, Janjetović, Marković, Alekson) to Berlin (Milićević & Marković, 2004:153). When considering the relationship Serbian historiography after the nationalist transition period had with the international historical schools in this context, its interactions with the Austrian school of historical anthropology and the Annales School should be mentioned. The historians who were sent to Germany and met with professors such as Jürgen Kocka and Holm Sundhaussen established contact with these schools. Meanwhile, Cirković's (1997)

Rabotnici, vojnici, duhovnici, Društva srednjovekovnog Balkana is an important work that shows the influence from the Annales school (Marković, Ković, & Milicević, 2007:307).

While the Central European University in Budapest opened its doors to most young historians for a year, some researchers completed their postgraduate studies at this university and returned to Serbia, and others stayed abroad. The Research Support Scheme program has allowed researchers to continue their education and research in countries such as Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands with two-year scholarships from institutions such as German foundations. Between 1998 and 2000, the study of the German *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*, which brought together Serbian and Croatian historians, published six conferences and four book editions (Milićević & Marković, 2004:153).

Meanwhile, the Department of Southeast European History at the University of Graz, Austria, has worked with the region to develop projects such as *Childhood in Southeast Europe* (Jovanović & Naumović, 2001). The institutions Social History Union, European Council, and EUROCLIO focused on history education and signed off on the projects *History and History Education in Southeast Europe*, *Joint History Project*, *National Memory*, and *Southeast European Peoples* (Marković, Ković, & Milicević, 2007:290). One of the research topics funded by international institutions during this period involved German and Jewish minorities. While Popović, Ristović, and Koljanin studied the Jewish community, Janjetovic and Beslin published studies on the Germans in Vojvodina.⁶

The institutions Udruženje za Društvenu Istoriju and Udruženje za Srpsku Povecnicu can be cited as examples of international cooperation with local and international institutions focused on the research of 19th and 20th-century social history and history education. The positive side of privatization and internationalization of publishing is that small publishing houses have translated many works into Serbian. The works of prominent names in nationalist literature such as Gellner, Habsbawn, Anderson, Smith, Todorova, and Colović were translated and published by 20th-century publishing houses. The publishing houses Zoran Stojanovic and CIO also introduced works such as the *History of Private Life* and the *History of Balkan Countries* to Serbian literature (Milićević & Marković, 2004; Žunić, 2002).

Marković and Milicević addressed the importance of literature, especially historical novels, which together with Serbian historiography have influenced Serbs' historical consciousness. Cošić's novel *The Time of Death about the First World War* has greatly influenced the agenda, with half a million copies sold. Also, Drašković's war trauma novel *Nož* [Knife] about the murder of a Serb family in Herzegovina by their Muslim neighbors on Christmas Eve in 1942, Isaković's *Tren 2*, and Selenić's *Ocevi i Oci* [Fathers and Ancestors] on communist oppression have also played notable roles in building Serbian national consciousness following the Nationalist-transition period (Milićević & Marković, 2004:169).

Serbian Historiography in the Postmodern Era: Social Historiography with a National Ethos

In the period of nationalist transition, the state, national identity, and society were redefined, and attempts were made to construct them. During this period when wars were central, historiography focused on marketization, parahistoriography, and the new nationalist paradigm. With the end of Milošević's rule, democratization and Europeanization were the main components in the construction of the Serbian state-identity-society to greater or lesser degrees until 2020. Under the strong pressure from international institutions, the years 2001-2003 and 2008-2014 represent the periods of intense liberalization, democratization, and Europeanization, while 2004-2007 and 2014-2020 represent a balanced nationalist-conservative period that cooperated with international institutions. This institutional framework of the state, society, and identity that developed in the balance of domestic and foreign politics is reflected in Serbian historiography. In this period, positivist and post-positivist approaches as well as nationalist and common history conceptions could appear together. Likewise, research was conducted on more topics than had been in other periods. While the presence of young researchers in the publications is noticeable, studies on the Middle Ages and the 20th-century can also be noted to have come to the fore. Diplomacy, politics, and wars as the main topics of the positivist tradition continue to be the main subjects of historiography. Comparative studies and studies with new methodological perspectives were also added. Prominent names in this period of Serbian historiography are Milan Koljanin, Goran Latinović, Radmila Radić, Slavko Gavrilović, Goran Vasin, Isidora Točanac, Dejan Mikavica, Vesilje Krestić, Aleksandar Krstić, Momilo Pavlović, Dra-

gana Amedoski, Mirjana Marinković, Ema Miljković, Tatjana Katić, Srdjan Katić, Aleksandar Fotić, and Olga Zirojević.

Journals, Historians, Works, and Featured Topics

Focusing on the work of the four main scientific journals of Serbian historiography to examine post-2000 historiography in more detail can help at seeing the current trends and themes. These journals are *Tokovi Istorija*, *Istorijski Časopis*, *Istorija 20. Veka*, and *Zbornik Matice Srpske za Istoriju* and were published during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. *Istorijski Časopis* emerged in 1949 as the journal of the Historical Institute and published one issue per year (except for two issues in 2007 and two in 2008). *Istorija 20. Veka* was launched in 1983 as a publication of the Institute of Contemporary History and published biannually between 1991-2021 (except for three issues published in 2010 and three in 2012). The journal *Tokovije Istorija* belongs to the Institute of Recent History for Serbia and was published biannually between 1997-2005 and thrice a year between 2006-2021. *Zbornik Matice Srpske za Istoriju* is part of the famous Matice Srpske publishing house and has been published biannually in Novi Sad since 1970. Between 2003 and 2020, about 1,200 studies were published in these four journals. 63% of which were devoted to topics such as wars, diplomacy/international relations, power, political party, political movement, and army, which in traditional historiography are treated under the heading of politics. Studies on the economy, modernization, culture, education, and printing/publishing under the title of society account for 10% of all studies. After 2000 in particular, studies such as language and media, demography, historiography, migration, social groups, gender, childhood, religion, memory, everyday life, and traditions increased under the influence of post-positivist historiography and methodology and account for 15% of all studies. A look at the journals shows that 50% of the studies published in 53 issues of the journal *Tokovije Istorija* between 2003-2020 focused mainly on the 20th century and the post-1945 period (Simić, 2017:219), while 15% of its studies were on society, and the number of studies dealing mainly with comparative research and new research areas accounted for 25% of the total research. The journal *Istorija 20. Veka* published the most research, with 65% of its studies dealing with traditional topics, 10% with social issues, and 25% with new areas. The journal *Zbornik Matice Srpske za Istoriju* focuses on studies of the history of Serbs outside the Habsburg Empire, Vojvodina, and Serbia, and its studies dealing with traditional poli-

tics accounts for 61% of the total research, while studies on society account for 8% and other areas for 30%. Finally, the journal *Istorijski Časopis* was found to devote 53% of all its studies to traditional politics, 12% to community studies, and 35% to new areas of study. Meanwhile, 95% of the published studies were found to be by local researchers, with over 65% of them using the traditional positivist method alongside traditional topics and about 10% dealing with new topics/new historical methods. More than 80% of the studies were found to not be based on a theoretical framework, while 20% of the new researchers avoided citing the old literature.

After 2010, the works from Stanojević, Corović, Mikadica and Krestić as the leading historians of post-Romantic and nationalist historiography were republished. Noteworthy, these works were republished even at a time when the postmodern and post-positivist period was focused on common culture, daily and social life, and women. In this context, one can speak of a strong structure of the post-romantic and nationalist historical perspective in Serbian historiography that is self-reproduced in every period.

Traditional political themes are seen to have retained their weight in Serbian historiography even after 2000. Topics such as diplomatic/international relations, party movements/ideologies, political elite and their biographies, war-riots, dynasty, state-power-institutions, army, Serbs, Belgrade, and the Great Wars were grouped under the heading of politics. Under the title of diplomatic/international relations, Latinović studied Yugoslavia's relations with countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. At the same time, topics such as the Crnka Ruka organization, the evils of Bulgaria, the Sarajevo assassination, and the Ottoman-Montenegro War were also studied with regard to World War I. The number of studies on England notably increased, with Aleksandar Rastović in particular having published many studies on this topic after 2014.⁷

Researchers such as Miloradović, Janjetović, Nikolić, Teinović, and Pešić have engaged in studies on political parties and movements, ideology, and political elites.⁸ As part of joint studies, they published papers on the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Serbs, especially under the leadership of Srđan Radić. Meanwhile, Jovanović and Radosavljević focused on intelligence and weapons in the 20th century.⁹

Church studies have always been one of the main topics of Serbian historiography. Between 2001-2020, the quantity and quality of church studies increased significantly, with Radić, Koljanin, Radosavljević, and Bulić becoming prominent names through

their research. While Radić wrote important works focusing on state and religious institutions and biographies, Radosavljević did research on churches and patriarchs in the 19th century, Koljanin studied the relationship between Jews and the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Bulić researched churches in various settlements.¹⁰

Studies such as gender, everyday life, and traditions, minority groups/others, history of historiography, and cinema in the period 2001-2020 attract attention as new topics of study in Serbian historiography. Many researchers who study the history of historiography believe that, while these developments in Serbian historiography are valuable, they lag behind current developments in world historiography due to their small share in all studies. Nevertheless, one can mention a Serbian historiography that has diversified in comparison to the pre-2000 studies, that incorporates comparative analyzes, and that has also put the issues of the post-positivist paradigm on the agenda. Within the framework of gender studies, studies on women have greatly expanded and deepened under the leadership of Dragana Amedoski, especially during the Ottoman period. The women's studies by Stolić, Škodrić, and Marković have also received attention.¹¹

Daily life and traditions can be stated to play a role in Serbian historical research, especially after 2010. Younger researchers have written studies on the basic components of daily life at home, in the village, and the city from the 16th-20th centuries. Also, Miljković-Katić, Vuletić, and Fostikov published works on crafts in the medieval Kingdom of Serbia.¹²

Studies on minorities and groups defined as "different" have also come to the fore during this period, with Germans and Jews being the most studied groups in this sense. While Radovanović focused on the immigration of Jews in Yugoslavia to Israel, Antolović published on the German minority, Stojanov on the Gypsies, and Koljanin, Ivanković, and Stojanović on anti-Semitism.¹³

After 2000, many young researchers have written studies on the history of Serbian historiography; examined history journals, main themes, trends, and developments of world historiography in Serbian historiography; and begun analyzing the content of history journals.¹⁴ Yugoslav cinema, which occupied an important place in the cultural policies of the Tito period, began to occur in research in the first decade of the new

millennium. The works from Pantić (2017:103-124) and Jeknić (2019: 65-84) on this topic are noteworthy.

Novaković (2008:460) and Šaljić (2013:345-360) published studies on the Islamic Union in Yugoslavia and Serbia. Also, Kosovo continued to be a main topic of Serbian historiography. Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 also had an impact on historiography. During the deepening of the Kosovo literature, publications were published on topics such as Kosovo politics, Albanian persecution, pre-20th-century Kosovo, and relations with Albania. Under the heading of Kosovo and politics, Gatalović, who'd dealt with the politics of Kosovo during the period of socialist Yugoslavia under the title "The Evils of Albanians in Kosovo," and Antonijević also published studies in this field. Stijović and Rastović attempted to study the influence of foreign policy in 19th-century Kosovo through ambassadors.¹⁵

Mirroring Developments in Serbian Historiography: Istorija Srpskog Naroda (1981-1993) and Istorija Srba (2017)

The Nationalist Transition Period

The Nationalist Transition Period was a period in Serbian historiography when the socialist ethos was replaced by the nationalist-conservative ethos, and some important historians who produced parahistoriography [false history-popular history] in the course of marketization advised the politicians on the wars of the 1990s. The most fundamental works for Serbian historiography also come from this period and covers the years 1981-2000. *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* is one of the most important works showing the relationship between the nationalist transition historiography and power. The work includes historians from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts such as Cirković, Mihaljčić, Mitrović, Stojanočević, Ekmečić, Samarčić, Veselinović, Gavrilović, and Medaković. These historians are among the leading names of socialist Yugoslavia and the nationalist transition period and contributed to *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* with many articles as well as edited several volumes. Except for Volume 4, a two-part book covering the period from the fall of Belgrade to the Great Migration, which was released in 1993, the other volumes were published between 1981-1986. In addition, *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* was republished in 1994 and 2000. All but one of the volumes from

this work covers a thousand years of Serbian history (the one exception only partially covers the topic) and are about the Ottoman Empire.

The current research considers the Ottoman narrative to be an exemplified variable of the relationship between power and history in Serbian historiography and history textbooks. The work *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* is also important because it involves the authors whose works had been published in Yugoslavia during the nationalist transition period and shows the transformation between the two periods. The preface to the first volume of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* states that this work had been planned since 1966 but was just published in the 1980s. The work also states that it aims to create a perspective on Serbian history by referring to historical sources and artifacts and by taking into account the methodological developments of world historiography within a Marxist perspective removed from the traditional presentation of history, which is far from being scientific and especially from a military and political point of view. The 10-volume book includes sections on language, literature, art, and architectural developments and has a special focus on politics and military developments. While the study attracts attention by referencing literature in the Ottoman and Habsburg areas up to the 1980s, it makes no mention of any theoretical or methodological framework (Cirković, 1981:7). In addition to *Istorija Srpskog Naroda*, other notable works that reveal the basic themes and content of the relationship between power and history in Serbian historiography are *Istorija Srba* by Corović (republished in the 1990s), one of the pioneers of nationalist historiography at the beginning of the 20th century, Ekmečić's *Stvaranje Jugoslavija*, and Luković's *Srbi Narod Najstarije*.

Volume I of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* covers the period from humanity's beginnings to 1371, Volume II covers 1371-1537, Volume III covers 1537-1699, Volume IV covers 1699-1805, Volume V covers 1805-1878 and Volume VI covers 1878-1918. This periodization was also made according to the turning points in Serbian history as determined by historians. Accordingly, the most fundamental turning points in eight centuries of Serbian history are the Battle of Maritsa in 1371, the Fall of Belgrade in 1537, the Great Migration in 1699, the First Serbian Uprising in 1805, the establishment of the Serbian Kingdom in 1878, the end of World War I in 1918, and the establishment of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom. Corović, on the other hand, considered the turning points in *Istorija Srba* to be the founding of the Nemanjić dynasty, the defeat in the Kosovo War, the fall of Belgrade, and the beginning of the Serbian uprisings.

At the center of all these historical turning points are the Ottomans (i.e., the Turks). Although the developments in language, literature, economy, and art are treated in broad sections and an attempt is made to move away from the nationalist narrative in the early 20th century and the socialist post-World War II Serbian historical narrative, the main themes of wars, uprisings, Serbs between Turks and Hungarians, migrations, and occupied Serbian territories are at the center of the narrative. Volume X of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* starts with the Serbian Kingdom; the Socialist Republic of Serbia; the existence of the Serbs outside Serbia; the Serbs living in Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Dalmatia as well as on the military border and in Hungary and evaluates and examines the Ottoman Empire (Rumelia) within the history of Serbia. Thus, *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* should be noted as having constructed the history and identity of Serbs with an essentialist and ethnosymbolic approach. Volume I remarkably conveys the history of the region they internalized as Serbian land from 30,000 years in the past to 1371 and narrates the South Slavs to have settled in the Balkans in the 6th century, to have then separated into two ethnic groups (i.e., Serbs and Croats) in the 9th century, and finally to have founded the magnificent medieval state under the Nemanjić dynasty in the 11th-13th centuries.

The 6000- to 7000-page work considers the Ottomans and Turks to be the same people. The first encounter with them takes place during the Battle of Maritsa, which is presented as the end of the medieval Serbian kingdom, the collapse of the dynasty, an unexpected loss, and the key battle of the Ottoman advance in the Balkans. Volume I of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* (1981:47) deals with the reliability of historical information about these wars. Apart from the place, time, and results of the wars, this volume states that no reliable information has yet been made available and the information within to have been based on myths. The death of Tsar Dušan in 1351 and the death of the brothers Uglješ and Vukašin in 1371 are stated to have plunged the 200-year tradition of the Nemanjić dynasty into a major crisis. The introduction of Volume II states that the 1371 Battle of Maritsa and the 1389 Battle of Kosovo led the Ottomans to settle in the region and colonize the territories they had won, moving them to Central Europe. After this date, the Serbian territories clearly became important for European countries, and the struggle between Serbs and Turks became one of the protective pillars of European civilization for Serbs. This resistance was made by Serbs long before the fall of Istanbul (*Istorija Srpskog Naroda*, Vol. I, 1981:7). Noteworthy, the Volumes I

and II intensively contain pictures of churches and priests. The relations of the medieval rulers with the church and the support of the church can be stated as important details in the narrative. The Battle of Kosovo is one of the main themes that have been addressed in all eras in terms of its consequences, the end of the medieval Serbian kingdom, and events such as betrayal. *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* should be noted to explain in detail the period before the Kosovo War, in particular the leadership of Prince Lazar, his relationship with the Church, and as a figure who'd revived the Nemanjić tradition. An attempt was noteworthy made to draw a framework by referring to many sources and documents related to the Battle of Kosovo itself. By examining the letters of the Bosnian king, Turkish and Byzantine documents, and the works of Constantine the Philosopher, the work attempts to provide a comparative perspective on the victor of the Battle of Kosovo and the developmental processes. Expressing how the Battle of Kosovo had quickly turned into a myth with new elements added, the work states Mavro Obrin to have written down the Kosovo myth in Italian for the first time in 1601 and that it had occurred in the oral tradition as the Heroes of Kosovo in the form of epic poems between the 18th-19th centuries (translated from Mihaljčić, 198:46):

Enriched with details from tradition, the Kosovo War had a strong impact on the following generations and contributed to the formation of people's historical consciousness. In people's minds, this war was and still is the most important and fateful event in the entire Serbian history, if not in all history. Likewise, the Battle of Kosovo was absolutely crucial for the relationship between Serbs and Turks. As a key event, the Battle of Kosovo has become a central point in the traditional historical calendar. Simplified and obscure information about the Serbian past was shared in the public consciousness in the period before and after the Battle of Kosovo. The Serbian state was believed to have been destroyed by this war, and both conflicts were associated with the beginning of centuries of slavery to foreigners. The surrender or betrayal of Kosovo was long denied, but these events have not been forgotten, driven by public testimony. The Battle of Kosovo and awareness of it undoubtedly played an important role in the liberation wars of the Serbian people.

Corović, the leading figure of romantic and nationalist historiography, is one of the historians constantly quoted in the post-nationalist transition period. His famous work *Istorija Srba* [History of the Serbs] is one of the main works on Serbian history to have

been reprinted repeatedly since the 1990s. The treatment of the Battle of Kosovo in his work is noteworthy. Corović addresses the Battle of Kosovo through Prince Lazar, Miloš Obilić, epic poems, and the deep traces it left behind, explaining Lazar as having viewed the strong relationship between the Church and the Nemanjić dynasty as an essential part of Serbian history. According to him, no other catastrophe occurred that has affected Serbian history as much as the Kosovo catastrophe, which has lingered for quite some time and left deep wounds. Miloš Obilić was a hero, and Corović (1993:260), who refrained from the claims of accusing Vuk Branković of treason, deliberately chose Lazar's death to set an example of national freedom and state independence for future generations. Reference is made to Prince Lazar's speech before the war:

Death may be better for us than survival. I would rather let death come to us than remain in the hands of the enemy. We have had enough on Earth, now it is time to fight a little to live in heaven forever (Corović, 1993:261).

The work explains the most important issues such as the Serbs' vassal relationship to the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of despotates, and the alliance with the Hungarians between 1389-1537 in great detail. The despotates of Stefan Lazarević and Đorđe Branković are situated within Serbian history in terms of the re-establishment of a state and the assumption of power up to the accession of Mehmet the Conqueror. In Đorđe Branković's words, the fate of Istanbul and the fate of Serbia and the Serbs are one. The fall of Serbia after the conquest of Istanbul and the death of Đorđe Branković as the most important political figure of the Serbs and Christians in 15th-century Balkans marked the end of the medieval Kingdom of Serbia. The struggle with the fall of Serbia between 1454-1459 and the fall of Belgrade in 1521 are described in the work *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* and given much more space than the Battle of Kosovo:

In 1459, the medieval Serbian kingdom, which had possessed an empire a century earlier and was one of the greatest powers, disappeared in the Balkan Peninsula. The struggle against the Turks lasted almost a hundred years, from the middle of the XIV century to the middle of the XV century. Of all the Balkan peoples, the Serbs put up the greatest resistance, but they could not stop the conquests. Nobody in Europe could stop the conquests. The united Balkan countries were replaced by a single political power, the Turkish Empire. The disintegration of the Serbian state could not be stopped either. After the Kosovo War in 1389, the Serbian kingdom

became a vassal country of the Sultan, and the region was the scene of wars almost all the time. While collecting a huge tribute, the Turks first collapsed the kingdom economically, then burned the villages, looted and destroyed the cities until they were in ruins. During all this time, the Serbian people were displaced. They were scattered across the Sava and Danube rivers. Serbian slaves were taken to the East, where they were sold and resold, settling in much of Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor. The fall of Smederevo on June 20, 1459, marked the beginning of centuries of Serbian enslavement. (Spremic, 1981:313)

The death of the last Serbian despot Pavle Bakić in 1537 after the fall of cities such as Belgrade, Mohacs, and Srem represents a new era and a turning point for the directors of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda*. This remarkable work was published in 1993 as a single volume covering the years 1537-1699 in Serbian history and differs significantly from other books written in the 1980s in terms of its Turkish narrative. Chapters such as “Turks and Islamization in Serbian History,” written by Radovan Samardić, are some of the most fundamental texts representing the nationalist-conservative historiography of the nationalist transition period. Although the footnotes at the beginning of the chapter indicate that it was written after the author reviewed 40 years of works and the archives of Venice, the Vatican, Vienna, Dubrovnik, and Paris, unlike other volumes published in the 1980s, the work in this volume is noteworthy rarely referenced. However, the chapter “Characteristics of the Turkish Administrative System” cites long quotations from Halil Inalcık’s classic work on the Ottoman Empire. *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* covers topics under the headings of “Turks in Serbian History,” “The Penetration of Islam in Southeastern Europe,” “Basic Features of Turkish Power,” “Serbs and the Regime of the Turkish Empire,” “Migration in Serbian History,” “The Serbian Orthodox Church,” “Serbs,” and “Wars.” The first topic of Volume III begins with the chapter “Turks in Serbian History” and expresses the relationship Turks have with Islam, Sharia, laws, the changes they brought to society, and the change of the Christian world in the Balkans in the face of the powerful Turkish Empire, where certain freedoms were granted through the religious communities. The Christian lands under Turkish rule had to change their appearance. The new settlers, the Timar system, the Qadis, and Islamization changed the ethnic and religious balance not only at the individual level but also at large. The Serbs were the largest Christian group to resist the Turks between 1371-1537 until the death of the despot Đurać after the Maritsa War. According to the

Serbs, the Turks were the ones who were repulsive, unreliable, and ultimately hostile; they were responsible for the destruction of Kosovo and Metohija, the most developed region of medieval Serbian civilization and the Albanian Arbanasi, until the Albanians revolted in 1912.

Samarčić (1993:14-15) writes openly in his text about forced Islamization, the *devshirme* [blood tax], and the genocide by the Turks:

No nation in Southeastern Europe has resisted as much as the Serbs. No one had been exterminated, killed, exiled, chained to slaves, or forcibly expelled as much as the innocent Serbian people. The Serbs had to endure Turkish persecution. With a single law, the lands were settled and the legal status of the region was changed. The Serbian people were shamelessly disregarded, and their lands were burned and destroyed. As a result of persecution and various tortures, people were humiliated, women were slapped in the face, and the laws and rites of the priests were slandered. The Turks collected tribute by blood, protected their sultans by taking the best and youngest children of the noble families, and strengthened their armies, yet undermined the power of the Serbian people and committed genocide.

According to Samarđić (1993:85-86), Islamization was practiced most on the Serbs. Although historiography debates whether or not this happened due to oppression, the transition from one religion to another can never be explained without it. Most Serbs converted to Islam to protect their lives and property. The Turks settled much less in the lands of the Serbs compared to other regions, instead bringing the Muslim population into existence through Islamization. Samarđić points out the settlement and Islamization of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. He explains that the poor population in Bosnia chose Islam because the Turks had promised economic and political prosperity. Likewise, he talks about how Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo had been expelled from the region by various means. Samarđić (Samarđić, 1993:35-37) interestingly notes that the Christians of the region who'd converted to Islam experienced psychological and mental changes over time that led to fundamental ethnic differences.

The nationalist-conservative narrative, which claims that Serbs prevailed under foreign powers with great vitality and were able to preserve their own identity through constant uprisings, was also used in the 1990s. Migrations have been discussed at length as another major trajectory of Serbian history. With the departure of the Nemanjić dy-

nasty from the historical scene, Serbs became constantly exposed to migration to the south and southwest (southern Hungary, Habsburg Empire). The Serbian presence in places such as Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and the military border is argued to have been created by these migrations, that the Serbs were used by the Habsburg Empire due to their military and strong structure alongside and against the Turks, and that this was especially envied by the Croats (Samarđić, 1993:103). On the other hand, the Serbs fleeing from the Turks were exposed to the policies of the Roman Catholic Church, which wanted to abolish Orthodoxy (Samarđić, 1993:83-84).

Although an attempt has been made to explain the social life of Serbs under Turkish rule through farms, towns, villages, and the Timar system, the main trajectory of the narrative about Serbs under Turkish rule involves the period between 1537-1804 and the vividness of uprisings and wars. Battles like Banat, Budin, Cyprus, the Habsburg-Ottoman Wars, and the Sieges of Vienna and personalities like Suleiman the Magnificent and Mehmet the Conqueror are the main elements of this narrative.

Volume IV, published in 1983, is about the 17th century. Samarđić also wrote the chapters "Serbs in the Turkish Empire (1699-1804)," "Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 18th Century," and "The Serbian Orthodox Church in the Turkish Empire." As can be seen from these titles, the chapters he'd written in 1993 on the 16th and 17th centuries are very similar to the main themes of the historiography of a socialist Yugoslavia devoted to Serbian history. These chapters present a framework that focuses on the administrative, social, and economic relations of Belgrade and the Bosnian Pashalik and their relations with Istanbul. He makes intensive references to Tricković's doctoral dissertation on the Belgrade Pashalik of 1687-1739.

Meanwhile, Gavrilović (1981:352-353) noted how the Turkish-Russian (1768) and Turkish-Austrian (1788) wars had intensified the Serbs' hopes for freedom and includes the Russian and Austrian rulers' and religious leaders' proposals to the Serbian people to fight together against the Turks:

Christians, churches, and women were severely tortured by the Turks, they were severely persecuted by the Turks, they hated them very much. The armies took oil, sheep, and more from the houses of the Christians and committed atrocities. The poor cried a lot because of anger and pain. Trade was destroyed under this pressure.

The Battle of Kochana Krajina, the persecution of the Janissaries, and the Selim III's reforms are dealt with extensively in Gavrilović's narrative, as they played an important role in the process that led to the Serbian uprisings of 1804. Volume V deals with the Serbian uprisings and the Serbian Revolution between 1804-1878 and tells the story of the Janissaries' daily terror, anarchy, and destruction of political and social order. The authors refer to the consequences of the Serbian uprisings as the Serbian Revolution. The images used in Volume V are also noteworthy, some of the heavily used ones being Cele Kula, Hajdut Veljko, the Tribute to the Janissaries, Vuk Karadžić, Obrenović, and the Uprising:

Before the Second Serbian uprising, the Turkish administration committed terrible atrocities, not only against the insurgents but also against women and powerless people, under the treatment of slaves, setting fire to every living thing. Jihad against Serbia was proclaimed, and most women were taken to the harem of Turkish soldiers. (Stojančević, 1986:96)

Hadži-Prodan's rebellion was started in 1814 under these conditions, but ended with the Turks taking revenge and killing hundreds of villagers, priests, nuns, and princes. Volume V also examines the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, Obrenović's and Karađorđević's leadership differences, their relations with the Ottoman Empire, and their proximity to Russia and Austria in the context of the impact of foreign policy. Obrenović gave the Serbs autonomy and a dual structure, laying the foundation for the Serbian principality in 1838 and the Serbian kingdom in 1878. After the topic of the Serbian uprisings, the volume goes on to deal with the Bosnian Pashalik and the province of Rumeli in the chapter "The Serbs Remaining in the Ottoman Empire." The narrative addresses the relations of the Bosnian Pashalik, Prištine, and Niš Sanjaks with the region involved in the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, the uprisings that developed in these regions (1809, 1835, and 1841), the terror of the Turkish administration, and the positions of the Serbs. The work addresses what had been going on in the borders of the Old Serbian geography as determined by Vuk Stefanovic Karadžić and also shows the borders of the Serbian State (Stojančević, 1986:217-135). Volume V gives the population figures of the Serbs within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Statistics referring to the censuses after 1876 show 43,035 Muslims and 28,091 non-Muslims to have been in Pristina and 74,212 Muslim and 24,297 non-Muslim men to have been in the Sanjak of Prizren. The work indicates by citing Austro-Hungarian that 1,158,000

Bosniaks and 496,000 Serbs were present in Bosnia. Settlements, wars, uprisings, and diseases are cited as the main reasons for the changes in the Serbian population (Stojančević, 1986:452-455). According to Stojančević, the expulsion of the Turks from Belgrade as a result of the Serbian uprisings had an enormous impact on the social, material, and spiritual world of the Serbs and enabled the liberation of the peasants from feudal obligations as well as free expression of traditional and religious life, national freedom, safety, and economic security.

The Period of EU Interaction

Parallel to the interaction with the EU and the developments in the historiography of the postmodern period, new perspectives and fields of study were introduced into Ottoman and Habsburg studies. The studies were deepened, and the obstacles to accessing the documents available in the archives were removed. When looking at the Ottoman and Habsburg studies that are increasing daily in the Serbian historiography, new institutions, journals, and young researchers are seen to be coming to the fore. These new structures and studies deepen and diversify Ottoman and Habsburg studies, underline the quality and objectivity of historical knowledge using methodological tools, and lay the foundations for writing new works.

In this regard, examining the extent to which the main works dealing with Serbian history reflect this framework is extremely important. In this period focused on democratization, Europeanization, and market economy, finding an impartial/true representation is not easy, as the works in the field of Serbian history can be written within the framework of different ideologies. Because the political life and historiography in Serbia after 2000 experienced fundamental turning points in 2001 and 2012, one can focus as an example on the differing main trajectories of the works published in this period on the narratives of Ottoman and Habsburg. Bataković's (2000; 2010) *Nova Istorija Srpskog Naroda*, Logos' (2017) *Istorija Srbija*, and Antić and Kecmanović's (2016) *Istorija Republike Srpske* added new developments to Serbian history alongside the nationalist view. On the other hand, the works *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* by Stanojević and *Istorija Srba* by Corović, the main historians of Serbian nationalist historiography respectively in the 1920s-1930s and the 1990s were noteworthy constantly republished between 2000-2010.

When examining the works *Nova Istorija Srpskog Naroda* (2001) and *Istorija Srbija* (2017), which are based on Serbian history, one can see the traces of Serbian nationalism and positivist movements in both works. After 2000, Serbian historiography was noted to have expanded so as to include a dimension dealing with social and everyday life, women, and minority groups, but studies and narratives focusing on politics and diplomacy continued. In this context, one can state that these works are good examples of this observation. Logos' *Istorija Srbija* makes frequent references to the 10-volume *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* from the nationalist transition period, *Istorija Srba* by Stanojević, and *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* by Corović. In addition, Aşıkpaşazade's work and Çelebi's *Seyahatname* are drawn from in many places, especially in *Istorija Srbija*, which made some different decisions in periodizing Serbian history and naming these periods (i.e., Serbs before the Nemanjić dynasty, Serbs from the Nemanjić dynasty to the mid-15th century (fall of Serbia), 15th- to 18th-century Serbs, and 19th-century Serbs). The turning points are the foundation of the Nemanjić dynasty, the fall of Serbia, and the beginning of the Serbian uprisings. He refrains from using descriptive adjectives in naming the periods. Bataković's work *Nova Istorija Srpskog Naroda* periodizes the eras as the settlement in the Balkans, the fall of the Despotates (5th-15th centuries), under the power of strangers (16th-18th centuries), struggle for independence and unification (19th century), and Serbs in Yugoslavia (1918-1991).

The borders of the medieval Kingdom of Serbia (i.e., Ancient Serbia) are the backbone of the Serbian historical narrative, which focuses on Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, the military border, the military and political history of the Serbs in Slavonia, their positions, social structure, economy, and the structures of the empires that ruled them. With the influence of postmodern historiography, advances in the studies of the Ottomans and Habsburgs, EU relations, and the departure from radical, nationalist, and conservative political lines compared to pre-2000, the main theme in works on Serbian history can be seen to persist but to also include new approaches and themes. As one of the main trajectories, the Battle of Kosovo is explained in terms of its development, course, and results as well as through the Kosovo myth. Throughout history only the Serbs were stated to have killed the Ottoman Sultan and the war was considered a Serbian victory; however, because of its results over time people, defined it first as a Pyrrhic victory and then as a Serbian defeat and Turkish victory. Despite the lack of information about the Battle of Kosovo in popular poems and developed myths,

Branković has been expressed as a traitor, Miloš Obilić as a hero, and Prince Čar Lazar as the most important saint in Serbian history with the involvement of the Church. This narrative is referred to especially in Mihaljčić's relevant chapter in *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* (Logos, 2017:326-330) The war tactics of the Ottomans in the Balkans are mentioned by referring to Krstić's works (as cited on p. 352).

Logos discusses the *devshirme* system and Islamization, which are indispensable themes of the narrative about the Ottoman period, through Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. The information about Sokollu Mehmet Pasha is much more detailed than the information in the works from other eras. His education, family, youth, political life in Istanbul, and contributions to Serbian history and to the Ipek Patriarchate are discussed and supported with visual materials. On the other hand, Logos describes *devshirme* in the classic narrative as a blood tax and mentions Muslim families who want their Muslim children to register as Christians and become a *devshirme*:

One of the most difficult obligations of the conquered Christian population was the devshirme, or blood tax, as it is popularly known. Every five years or so, families had to give some of their 8- to 15-year-old non-Muslim boys. Sometimes as many as 3,000 boys were accumulated in a year. Parents tried to prevent their children from becoming devshirme by bribing or even mutilating their own children. The townspeople and Muslim villagers did not pay their tribute with their blood because they were Muslims, but there were cases of poor Muslim children being handed over to Christians and made devshirme for a better life. (Logos, 2017:318-319)

Islamization is central to the narrative of Bosnia and Kosovo and Serbs' forced emigration from their homeland. After the Kosovo War, Islamized Albanians were argued to have settled in the region and the Serb population living in Bosnia to have been intensively Islamized to prosper under the Ottoman system, especially in the late 15th and 16th centuries. In the current period of postmodern historiography and the approach to the EU in terms of power and politics, the most basic theme that differs in the narrative compared to other periods is the addition of sections on the social, daily, urban, and village lives of Serbs in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The narrative begins with negative examples such as the constant state violence against non-Muslims. This violence is evident, for example, in the fact that church bells were not allowed to be

rung and important churches had been converted into mosques such as Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, St. Dimitri Church in Thessaloniki, and Goddesses of the Thessaloniki and Banya churches in Prizren (Logos, 2017:392)

Logos (2017:394) mentions how the Christian populations and Serbs in the cities had been Islamized, migrated, or moved away and settled in the suburbs and villages:

The Christian population decreased in the cities. According to the Shari'a, they had the right to life and property and could preserve their faith, but they were obliged not to interfere in the lives of Muslims. They were not allowed to disturb Muslims by ringing church bells or to move on the streets as they pleased. The poor, who had hardly anything, had to seek shelter with the Muslims. Non-Muslims were not allowed to ride horses or carry weapons unless they had a special certificate (berat).

Logos (2017:395) states that, since the 16th century, the Muslim population had increased in Serbian cities, and the cities took the form of Eastern architecture and consisted of quarters, bazaars, mosques, madrasas, hammams, and caravanserais:

Hammams, madrasas, and buildings for administrators were built in the cities. The streets were winding and dirty, mostly dirt, without cobblestones. Muslims mostly built houses of brick and wood, rarely stone. The more modest houses in towns had two or three rooms. The houses in the city were one or two stories high. The middle part of the floor was the hallway, but there was a sofa. There was space for family gatherings and receiving guests, as well as areas for smoking and chatting. The Muslim house consisted of two parts. The male part of the house (selamlık) was the part where life happened and was open to visitors. The female part of the house (harem) was accessible only to the family. The floors were covered with carpets. The windows were located on the wall facing the courtyard.

One of the prominent themes in the narratives about the Ottoman period relating to gender studies is that evaluations about women have started to take place. "In the eastern cities, women avoided going out and men dominated the streets. But this did not mean the complete isolation of women" (Logos, 2017:394). One narrative that makes observations about women's dress in Ottoman society includes the following information:

Women's shirts are decorated with embroidery on the sleeves, chest, and lower hems. The rest of the clothing (belt, skirt, dress, vest) is usually made of sheepskin. Women adorn themselves with silver or gold jewelry and do not go out in public without a headscarf, hat, or veil. Muslim women must dress in such a way that men can mainly only see their eyes, hands, and feet in public. There is also a patriarchal lifestyle in the villages. (Logos, 2017:394)

On the other hand, Muslims are stated to have made music with wind and percussion instruments when they gather, while Christians mostly use bagpipes, violins, and flutes (Logos, 2017:395).

Logos' (2017:394) *Istorija Srbija* also contains a narrative about daily life in Serbian villages in the Ottoman Empire, where most villages are predominantly Christian, that they are spread out due to the fear of violence and the arbitrariness of the rulers, and that the order consists of desolate and neighboring houses:

The representations of peasant houses in Vojvodina are particularly deplorable. They are shelters and semi-shelters. Since the Ottoman conquest, the Serbs have lived in small villages and moved away from the Ottoman center, trying to build their houses away from the important roads. Unlike the Christians, the Muslim villages had more houses. Only the poor population made their own clothes.

Another problem villagers were stated to face in their daily lives was travel, with safety problems, uncertainty, the traders having houses along the routes, and the attacks on their caravans causing great harm to the villagers.

Conclusion

Before comparatively examining the impact these turning points in ideological and political power had on the historical narrative through history textbooks, the results need to be analyzed in terms of historiography. Obviously, the general trend of the historiography of the period in question reveals the main reference texts of official history. For this reason, the general trends, framework, ruptures, institutions, and studies of historiography clearly were not developed separately from the basic framework of ideological power. The basic texts written in the nationalist transition periods and the historians can be suggested to have fed the official historiography. The research themes from the postpositivist period began to take root in Serbian historiography in parallel with

the political and methodological transformations that took place during the period of interacting with the EU.

In Serbian historiography, the romantic-nationalist, Marxist, and post-romantic nationalist schools developed by using the positivist scientific historical methodology. Therefore, these schools are intertwined with power, ideology, and national interests. Post-2000 in particular, the effects of Europeanization, liberalization, democratization, and methodological differentiation through the presence of historians trained abroad made the existence of the post-positivist school visible through themes such as gender, minorities, common history, the other, everyday life, memory, and childhood. During the period of nationalist transition, historians who tried to stay away from government relations and develop strategies to escape official historiography, as well as young historians who had studied abroad, especially during the Milošević period, paid attention to the development of academic historiography and conducted studies on the need for a historical methodology. The young historians who were educated during the period of nationalist transition and who emphasized academic historiography notably came to the fore with their differentiating works in historiography after 2000.

The interventions of ideological power, values, and conception of history in the nationalist transition historiography are clearly observable. Historians were employed, active, and prominent in the historical institutions of the state. Clearly the changes in the sphere of power and ideological power have affected the general framework of historiography. The most important development in the period from 1980-2000 was the Memorandum published by the members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1987. Likewise, historians in the 1990s came to the fore who produced the period of fake history/parahistoriography by publishing articles in or addressing the official publications of the state. The Chetnik movement that had been denounced in the socialist period and defined as post-romantic and nationalist historiography was redefined. The victims of World War II have been heroized, the oppression from the communist regime has been expressed, and the victims have been highlighted. Therefore, the main themes of pre-World War I historiography such as the golden age, dynastic history, the leadership and protection of the Church, the victimization of the nation, the genocide and the subjugation of the Serbs, and the uprisings were replaced with the Marxist terminology and perspective in order to generate the values of ideological power and the legitimacy of the new order and the wars.

Historians such as Cirković, Ekmečić, Mihaljčić, Samardžić, Zirojević, Krestić, Veselinović, and Gavrilović made themselves prominent by participating in and producing works on both the socialist and nationalist transition periods. Another common feature of all these historians is that they had been long-time members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), one of the basic institutions of official historiography. Historians such as Miljković, Katić, Fotić, Marinković, and Amedovska are also historians who participated in both the nationalist transition period as well as the post-2000 interaction period with the EU.

Meanwhile, historians such as Cirković, Ekmečić, Mihaljčić, Samardžić, Krestić, Veselinović, and Gavrilović have written the 10-volume *Istorija Srpskog Naroda*, which presents the general trajectories of the historical concept of Socialist Yugoslavia and the nationalist transition period. The work was published between 1981-1993 and embodies both positivist and Marxist historiography as well as the spirit of the time when historiography had turned into a post-Romantic and nationalist historiography. The third volume of *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* was published in 1993 and consists of texts that also include works from Samardžić and Krestić. In contrast to the works published between 1981-1986, this third volume contains texts that use nationalist terminology the most. Genocide, immigration, blood tax, Kosovo as the homeland, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, and the processes of Catholicization and Islamization are strongly emphasized and form the undisputed legitimization for wars. Meanwhile, Krestić is also represented in this work and was one of the leading authors of the famous SANU Memorandum published in 1987. He authored the book *Through Genocide to a Greater Croatia* and then became an advisor to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia. Radovan Karadžić was later tried as a war criminal and was an ardent supporter of Slobodan Milošević throughout the 1990s until being handed over to the Hague. These two historians not only uncovered the basic framework of the historical perspective of official historiography but also provided extremely important evidence to show that ideological power was involved in the main works from that period.

Historians such as Miljković, Zirojević, Katić, Fotić, Marinković, and Amedovska are the historians who studied history between 1990-2020 (i.e., the post-Romantic nationalist period and Europeanization and the post-positivist period), and one can see differences in the topics and methods they studied during these two periods. While Miljković published many studies on Islamization and resettlement in the 1990s, she

also worked on topics such as everyday life, Ottoman heritage in the Balkans, Serbian society under Ottoman rule, the Ottoman Empire in Serbia, and the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire alongside the effects from the change of ideological power after 2000 and the post-positivist historiography and became one of the historians who enabled the transformation between the two periods. In addition, authors such as Zirojević, Fotić, and Marinković focused on the Church, converts, Islamization, and waqfs and continued their studies after the first decade of the new millennium, producing studies that focus on Ottoman archives, documents, and social historiography. While historians such as Amedovska focused on gender studies, women's studies, and waqfs, young historians such as Todorović and Ristonović wrote studies on such topics as Islamic common culture, Islamic holidays and festivals, and the common Ottoman heritage in Serbia, topics that first found their place in historical studies after 2000.

The works *Istorija Srpskog Naroda* and *Istrorija Srba* on Serbian history were written by different authors from different perspectives in two different periods after 1990 and have significant thematic similarities such as names, subtitles, concepts used in the content, periodization, and created differences in terms of the ideological power, values, and methodology of each period, and these are reflected in the Serbian historical narrative in terms of continuities and changes.

Endnotes

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Ibtidaiye Mektebs in the Kaza of Gjilan According to the Ottoman Sources During 1900-1906

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Abstract: Kosovo during the Ottoman period was characterized by increased activities regarding youths' upbringing and education. Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova, Peja, Vushtrri, Gjilan and many other Kosovo *kazas* [administrative districts] were centers for educating and training children. This fact is confirmed by the number of the first Muslim cadres of educated people who made a name for themselves in the field of literature and poetry of the classical and modern Ottoman periods, as was the case with the poets of the Divan such as Mesihî of Prishtina, Dukagjinzade Ahmet Bey from Dukagjin and Mehmet Akif Ersoj from Peja (d. 1936). Education activity in Kosovo during the Ottoman administration took place in institutions that were observed by the High Council of the Islamic Religion and the Ministry of Education itself. As a result, researchers have the opportunity to trace official data on the educational and cultural activities that were conducted in sanjaks, *kazas*, and various villages of Kosovo. These activities are very well reflected in the documentation of the time, starting with the Salname of the Vilayet of Kosovo and other documents such as testimonials, student certificates, and various decisions of education directorates at the local level.

This paper addresses the certificates of students from the Llashtica, Pidiq, Caravajka, and Remnik *Maktabs* [schools] for 1902-1903 school year and Pogragja Maktab for 1905-1906 and also provides data from the schools' rosters regarding the number of students, the names of the *müderris* [teachers] who served in the Madrasas of Gjilan and Doburçan in the early 20th century.

Keywords: Kosovo, Gjilan, Maktab, Llashtica, Pidiq, Caravajkë, Remnik, Pogragja.



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Introduction

The development of cultural-educational activity in Kosovo during the early Ottoman period is closely related to the expansion of the Ottoman administration and the spread of Islam in these areas. The main purpose of establishing educational institutions was to teach Islamic religious rules. Thus, along with mosques, tekkes, and *hamams* [public baths], the first *maktabs* [schools] were built, located in the *külliyeye* [complex of buildings next to a mosque] (Çobanoğlu, 2002:542). These *maktabs* were set up with individual or even waqf endowments. One of the first *maktabs* in Kosovo was established by the well-known poet Suzi Çelebi of Prizren in Prizren before 1513, who worked in this *maktab* as a teacher until the end of his life (Kaleshi, 1962:103). A few decades later in 1586, Koca Sinan Pasha built a maktab in Kaçanik (Kaleshi, 1979: 73-129).

In addition to the *maktabs* for children, which were also the lowest phase of education where literacy and the basics of the Islamic religion were taught, madrasa schools were set up in large centers and offered the most advanced education of the time. The city of Vushtrri, which traversed the largest territorial space of the Sanjaks in the territory of Kosovo, was also characterized by advanced educational activity for the time. In 1455, one could encounter the madrasa built by Gazi Ali Bey (Rexha, 2004:78). The cities of Kosovo in the 16th-19th centuries had more than 10 madrasas (e.g., Prizren, Gjakova, and Peja had two madrasas, while Vushtrri, Prishtina, Gjilan, and Dragash had one; Beqirbegović, 1973:82). Among the most famous madrasas of the Ottoman period in Kosovo were the Madrasa of Mehmet Pasha in Prizren, built in the first decade of the 16th century (Kaleshi, 1974:470) and the Atik Madrasa (Medrese-i Atik) in Peja that was built in 1513 by Mehmed Bey¹ (TS.MA.e. 4127. d.7093, 11-20 Receb 922/10-19 August 1516), Madrasa *Besharet Ket'hyda* that was built in 1575 in Prishtina (Baltacı, 2005:172, 266), as well as the Great Madrasa of Gjakova built in 1794 (Beqirbegović, 1973:94). While 23 *maktabs* were registered in the 19th century in the Vilayet of Kosova, one *ruşdiye maktab*² [middle school] and one *idadiye maktab*, which is equiv-

1 The waqf of Mehmet Bey ibn Abdulkadir states: “commemorating the day of Judgment (Cataclysm), when the brother will flee from the brother and in order to gain privilege from His Lord for refreshment under His (God) Grace on the Day when there will be no other Grace, from his pure and precious wealth in the center of Peja, which is dependent from the Sanjak of Shkodra, set up a 12-room classroom and a beautiful madrasa.”

2 In the Ottoman education system, students received their primary education in the primary school known as an *ibtidaiye maktab*, then passed to the upper primary school known as a *ruşdiye maktab*, and then

alent to a high school. Meanwhile, during the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) alone, 381 new *maktabs* were opened in the Vilayet of Kosovo (Olgun, 2016:99). In addition to Islamic religious subjects, other subjects such as foreign languages (Arabic and Persian), mathematics, geometry, logic, calligraphy were taught in these *maktabs* (Uzunçarşılı, 1988:11).

Maktabs and Their Modernization

Maktab is derived from the root of the verb ك ت ب [k-t-b], which means “to write,” with *maktab* meaning the place or building of learning knowledge (Bozkurt, 2004:5). These schools were known to the Abbasids as *Kuttâb* and to the Seljuks and Ottomans of the classical period (1300-1800) as *sibyan mektebi* (primary school). In the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, *maktabs* would become known by numerous names, depending on the nature of the activity that was exercised there. *Dârü't-ta'lim*, *dârü'l-'ilm*, *Mu'alimhâne*, *Mahalle mektebi*, *taş mektebi*, and *mekteb-i ibtidâiye* are other terms for *maktabs* encountered in the official documentation of the time (Baltacı, 2004:6).

Until 1847, *maktabs* operated according to the classical curricula and taught according to the curricula drafted and approved by the Islamic *Ulama* [guardians of knowledge], where the main purpose was to teach how to read the Qur'an and the basic knowledge of the Islamic religion. After 1847, the first attempts to modernize some schools are seen in Istanbul (Ergün-Çiftçi, 2006:3–5). The reform came as a need of the time expressed through state bureaucrats. As a result, Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) issued a decree in 1824 that provided reform for children's education (Berkes, 2003:179). However, implementing the decree was impossible, especially because the Sultan himself was known to be dependent on the support of the Ulema at this time. However, 14 years later, the Sultan's is seen to have made a second attempt at education reform. The Education Commission presented the Sultan with an advisory report, or *Layiha* [memorandum], on the reform in children's education as a continuation of the decree of 1824. The main focus of this Sultan-approved report was the unification of the education system. Thus, the empire for the first time officially demanded the right to organize and supervise children's education (Kodaman, 1991:59). Once the report was enacted, debates sparked between the *Ulama* personalities and reformers who presented themselves as representing the Tanzimat [Reorganization]. The former

to the *idadiye maktab*, or high school.

felt the primary schools (Sibyan Mektebs) should be maintained under the old system, where their management was under the competence of the Islamic Ulama and considered the curriculum proposals in particular to be secular and, as such, unacceptable. Meanwhile, the reformers felt that *maktabs* needed to be collective and, as such, also unified in a system able to prepare the new generations. Even after this debate, the *maktabs* remained under supervision of the Ottoman Religious Works Administration while taking some of the commission's suggestions into account regarding teacher inspections, compulsory education for each child, learning how to write and read the Qur'an for the neighborhood *maktabs*.

The need for reform was also reflected during the reign of Sultan Abdulmejid (r. 1839-1861). Thus, on April 8, 1847, a circular spread the order that the period for primary education was to be four years long, with writing and reading to be taught simultaneously. During the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz (r. 1861-1876), the *Muslim Primary Schools Commission* (Mekâtib-i Sibyan-ı Müslim Komisyonu) drafted a new regulation in 1868 that provided for the unification of education throughout the empire. Each neighborhood and village was envisaged as having one or two *maktabs*, with the teaching period in the primary schools being four years, and the mandatory age for sending boys to a *maktab* being between 6-10 years old, while 7-11 years old for girls; if a neighborhood or village had two *maktabs*, one would be dedicated to boys and the other to girls. This circular also specified the subjects to be taught as well as the manner in which exams would be held. Accordingly, primary schools would teach the following subjects: the reformed Arabic alphabet, the Noble Qur'an, Tawhid, Ahlak, the Basics of Islam, Writing Lessons, Algebra, Ottoman History, Geography, and the General Knowledge course (Kodaman, 1991:62-65).

In the period of Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) primary education was given great importance as a means of eradicating ignorance and preparing generations loyal to the state. In order to ensure the best possible education reform, education inspectors were appointed in the Vilayets. One reform supporter was Daut Efendi Boriçi from Shkodra, who in 1880 was appointed general inspector of the *ruşdiye* schools for all of Anatolia (Bello, 2008:49).

As part of these reforms, the *Maârif Müdürlüğü* [Superintendent of Schools] was formed, with superintendents active in 25 different vilayets of Ottoman geography in 1892, in-

cluding the vilayets of Kosovo, Janina, Shkodra, and Bitola (Kodaman, 1991:37-38). At the same time, the superintendent was the highest educational institution at the vilayet level and automatically became a member of the *Vilayet Maarif Meclisleri* [Vilayet Education Council] (Kodaman, 1991:59).

As a result of the Ulama's insistence on keeping the primary schools under their control during the Tanzimat, a kind of parallelism occurred in the *mektebs* and these are distinct in the records of the time, with the *mektebs* under the Ulama supervision being registered as *sibyan maktabs* and those under state supervision being identified by the new name *ibtidaiye maktab* [primary school].

This division is also evidenced in some *maktabs* in the *Kaza* of Gilan. As for the *maktabs* in the villages of Cernica, Upper Verbica, and Pogradja, three classes enrolled and taught students according to the reform, while another class was registered as Şube Şakırdani [parallel students] and maintained the old conservative system (Ulama) (BOA, ME.IBT: 230/9).

Schools in the Kaza of Gjiilan According to Salnames [Yearbooks] and Student Lists/ Certificates in the Early 20th Century

An important source for the state of education in the Ottoman vilayets is the *Salnames* [yearbooks] that were compiled in the form of state reports and contain detailed data on the state of the administration, army, education, and other areas of interest for the administrative areas under Ottoman rule. Kosovo, which until the end of the 19th century had been divided into sanjaks affiliated with the Principality of Rumelia, rose to the status of a vilayet in 1877/1878 with the Ottoman administrative reorganization of 1871. It included an area of 32,000 sq. km., bordered on the east by Bulgaria, on the south by Thessaloniki, on the west by the Vilayets of Shkodra, Montenegro, and Bosnia, and on the north by the Kingdom of Serbia (Ünlü, 2015:51). Immediately following the founding of the Vilayet of Kosovo, the first *salname* was drafted 1879.³

The data from the rosters of the Vilayet of Kosova indicate the Kaza of Gjiilan to have had one madrasa with two *müderises* [professors] in 1900: Adem Efendi with 60 students and Jusuf Efendi with 40 students; a *ruşdiye maktab* with 70 students and two

³ Six *salnames* were drafted for the Vilayet of Kosovo, one for 1879, 1883, 1885, 1887, 1893, and 1896.

müdrises (i.e., Shehabeddin Efendi and Kamber Efendi) and a teacher of Ottoman writing of the *riq'a* style (i.e., Ali Efendi); an *ibtidaiye maktab* for boys with 160 students and two *muallims* [teachers] (i.e., Hafra Abdülhalim Efendi and Hacı Osman Efendi); an all-girls *maktab* of the Bazaar with 45 students and one teacher (i.e., Haxhi Ali Efendi); an *ibtidaiye maktab* in the neighborhood of the Atik Mosque with 110 students and two *muallims* (i.e., Hajrullah Efendi and Hafız Mustafa Efendi); a *maktab* for girls in the neighborhood of the Atik Mosque with 30 students and one *muallim* (i.e., Tahir Efendi); the *Mekteb-i İbtidaiye-i Cedid* for boys with 30 students and run by Hafız Jusuf Efendi, and a *maktab* for Christians with 82 students (30 boys and 52 girls).

Meanwhile, the districts of Gjilan had 45 active *maktabs*. Of these villages, 40 were Muslim and five were non-Muslim (Kosova Vilayet Salnamesi, 1318 AH:618-621). However, the *salname* compiled by the Ministry of Education in 1321 AH / 1903 AD, registered the Madrasa of Gjilan with the *müdris* Ademi and his 80 students. According to this data, the madrasa was located in the *Atik* [Old] neighborhood and the donor of this school/madrasa were the *karye ahalisi* [neighborhood residents]. Also, another educational institution built by *karye ahalisi* was the madrasa of Dobërçan located in the village of Dobërçan with 55 students under the direction of the *müdris* Prof. Jusuf (Maarif Salnamesi, 1321 AH:760-772). Another important piece of information regarding the historiography of these schools concerns the years of establishment and construction costs for these *maktabs*. Although incomplete, this information is given in the *Salname* of 1901/1902. According to these data, 46 *maktabs* were operational in the Kaza of Gjilan, with three in the city and 43 in the villages. The oldest *ibtidaiye maktab* in the Kaza of Gjilan was built in 1881/1882 in the village Remnik, followed by the ones in Llashtica and Ceravajka built in 1882/1883, in the *Atik* [Old] Mosque Neighborhood built in 1883/1884, and in the *Cedid* [New] Neighborhood and Pohvan built in 1896/1897. In terms of the financial cost spent during the construction of the *maktabs* are the following: The *maktabs* in the neighborhoods of *Cedid* (the new) and Pohvan as well as in the villages of Zhiti, Hogosht, upper Karachevo and Zarbica costed 900 kurush for each one; in Lubisht, Malisheva, Hodonofce and Polich costed 840 kurush for each one; in Polichka costed 700 kurush, the *maktab* of Svirca costed 600 kurush; the *maktab* of the neighborhood *Atik* costed 9 000 kurush, in Caravajka and Remnik costed 5 000 kurush for each one, in Reka (Pidic) 1755 kurush and the *maktab* of Llashtica 2 500 Kurush (Maarif Salnamesi, 1319)

Maktabs in the Kaza of Gjilan according to Salnames of Kosovo from
1318 AH/1900 AD

Maktab's name	Teacher Name	Number of students	Number of Girls
Llashtica Village Maktab	Fettah Efendi	25	
Remnik	Regep Efendi	20	
Reka (Pidiç) ⁴	Bajram Efendi	30	
Bresalc	Islam Efendi	25	
Sllakoc of Muhaxherëve	Hasan Efendi	45	
Cërrnicë	Jashar Efendi	42	
Zhiti	Emin Efendi	30	40
Pozhoran	Ramadan Efendi	15	
Sllatinë e Epërme	Mustafa Efendi	60	
Sadovinë of Çerkezëve	Ahmed Efendi	20	
Komogllavë	Osman Efendi	60	
Smirë	Ramadan Efendi	25	
Novobërdë	Arif Efendi	40	
Budrikë e Epërme	Fejzullah Efendi	15	
Malishevë	Hasan Efendi	80	
Pogragjë	Hajji Salih Efendi	48	15
Dobërçan	Zejnullah Efendi	60	
Hodonoc	Jusuf Efendi	20	
Karaçevë e Epërme	Shaban Efendi	45	
Zarbicë	Hasan Efendi	15	
Rogoçicë	Hasan Efendi	20	
Hogosht	Hasan Efendi	45	
Desivojçë	Jakub Efendi	76	
Krilevë	Fazli Efendi	20	

⁴ The village of Reka consisted of the following villages of today: Shurdhan, Pidiç, Dunavë, Demiraj, and Haxhaj, while the *maktab* was in the village of Pidiç and not in the village of Haxhaj, as claimed by some scholars. At the same time, from the information we have from the field, we are aware that the *maktab* of Pidiç village was near the mosque of Pidiç, and students in this school were from the villages of Haxhaj, Demiraj, Pidiç, Shurdhan, Dunav, and Stanqic as well as other villages around the river.

Koretinë	Behlul Efendi	26	
Busavat	Sejdi Efendi	15	
Përlepnjë	Salih Efendi	30	
Polëçkë	Shaban Efendi	n/a	
Caravajkë	n/a	n/a	
Gumnishte	Islam Efendi	n/a	
Marecë	Hasan Efendi	n/a	
Svircë	Xhafer Efendi	n/a	
Zajkocë	Hasan Efendi	n/a	
Shipashnicë e Epërme	Sulejman Efendi	n/a	
Kopernicë	Omer Efendi	n/a	
Topanicë	Ejub Efendi	n/a	
Vërbicë e Epërme	Hasan Efendi	n/a	
Gjylekar	Iljas Efendi	n/a	
Mirosal	Lutfi Efendi	n/a	
Livoç i Poshtëm	Jashar Efendi	n/a	
Viti	Hamirka? Efendi	40	
Ranilluk	Jovan Efendi	34	
Bostan	Risto Efendi	20	
Kamenicë	Enço? Efendi	n/a	
Pasjan	Sava	n/a	

Another source and one of the most detailed in terms of student data are the lists in the form of joint transcripts which were compiled in order to reflect the overall success of the students. This resource also provides details on the students' identities, including their names and in most cases their father's name, as well as the students' ages and the curriculum.

Regarding this information, the *ibtidaiye maktab*s in the villages of Llashtica, Reka/Pidiç, Caravajka, Remnik, and Pogradja, taught according to the three-class system with the exception of the Pogradja *maktab* which also had one class registered as *şube şakirdani* [parallel students]. According to the formulation of the subjects of this parallel, this means that students in the class were learning according to the classical/conservative curriculum supervised by the Ulama.

In the reformed *ibtidaiye mektebs*, the curriculum was much more advanced. In addition to religious subjects, scientific subjects were also taught. For example, the first class of primary school taught the following four subjects: Alphabet, Reading the Qur'an, Computation, and *ilmihal* [Basic knowledge of the Islamic religion]. The second class had students learn seven subjects: Qur'an, *ilmihal*, Reading Qur'an, Ottoman Grammar, Mathematics, Ahlāk [morality], and writing Ottoman of the *Syls* type. The third and final class taught nine subjects: the Qur'an and Tawhid, general *ilmihal*, History of Ottoman civilization, Abbreviated Ottoman Geography, Children's Education/Civic Education, Ottoman Language Syntax, Mathematics, Dictation, and *Syls* type writing (BOA, MF.IBT: 122/103, 23 Temmuz 1318 / 05 August 1902).

Coverage of the Curriculum According to the List/General Transcripts Issued by the Ibtidaiye Maktabs for the village Reka (Pidiç of Nahiye Karadak) in the Kaza of Gjilan for the 1902/1903 School Year (MF.IBT. 122 / 103.9, 13 Temmuz 1318 / 26 August 1902):

Class 3											
Name of student and father	Age of Student	Quran and Tawhid	General Ilmihal	History of Ottoman Civilization	Abbreviated Ottoman Geography	Education of Children	Ottoman Grammar	Math	Dictation	Writing in <i>Syls</i>	Final Assessment
Bahtjar Efendi, son of Abdullah	14	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	90
Qahil ef., son of Ibrahim	15	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	89
Ibrahim ef., son of Munish	14	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	88

Class 2									
Name of Student and Father	Age of student	Quran	Ilmihal	Reciting the Qur'an	Ottoman grammar	Computation	Ahlak [Morality]	Writing Sylys	Final Assessment
Hilmi Efendi, son of Qahil	13	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	70
Zulfi ef., son of Latif	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	69
Sherif ef., son of Fejzullah	14	10	10	10	9	9	8	9	63
Nezir ef., son of Ajet	13	10	10	10	9	9	8	8	62
Bajram ef., son of Sulejman	15	10	10	10	9	8	8	8	61
Daut ef., son of Adem	14	10	10	10	9	8	8	7	60

Class 1							
Name of student and father	Age of student	Ottoman Alphabet	Quranic passages	Computation	ilmihal	Final Assessment	
Fejzullah Efendi., son of Mahmud	12	10	10	10	10	40	
Shaban ef., son of Rexheb	14	10	10	9	9	38	
Shevki ef., son of Hafiz	12	10	10	9	8	37	
(?) ef., son of Demir	13	10	10	8	8	36	
Bajram ef., son of Demir	15	10	10	8	7	35	
Beqir ef., son of Sylejman	14	10	10	8	7	35	
Halit ef., son of Maliq	12	10	10	8	7	34	
Murtez ef., son of Mustafa	13	10	9	7	6	32	
Rexhep ef., son of Tahir	14	10	9	7	6	32	

As seen in the data from the *salnames*, the number of primary schools for girls in the Vilayet of Kosovo was very small in relation to primary schools for boys, and one of the girls *maktabs* was organized in Pogradja. This reality is also reflected in the lists and transcripts from the 1905/1906 school year as issued by the village mayor.

Of the *şube şakirdâni* [parallel students], which consisted of five boys and nine girls between the ages of 5-8, only two students (Bejtullah and Nurije) continued their learning in the first class in the *ibtidaiye maktab* (reform primary school). The first class of the *ibtidaiye maktab* had 15 boys and seven girls (aged 7-9 years) enrolled. Of the seven girls, only one was assessed, five had repeated the class, and four had not participated in the exams (BOA. MF.IBT: 230/9, 1323/1324 hegira calendar (1906/1907)).

Students' Overall List / Transcript from the village of Pogradja for the 1905/1906 School Year (MF.IBT: 230/9, 1323/1324 hegira calendar (1906/1907)):

Third Class		
Student name	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Imran Efendi	11	105
Idris Efendi	10	104
Mehmed Efendi	9	100
Mustafa Efendi	8	98
Hamdi Efendi	7	95
Hysejin Efendi	10	81
Ismail Efendi	12	78
Rexhep Efendi	11	84

Second Class		
Student name	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Junus Efendi	7	88
Bajram Efendi	13	86
Hasan Efendi	8	86
Rexhep Efendi	7	79
Talib Efendi	12	74
Habib Efendi	7	71
Ejup Efendi	7	69

Abdullah Efendi	7	68
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First Class		
Student name	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Junus Efendi	7	59
Shahin Efendi	12	57
Halid Efendi	8	55
Halid Efendi	8	54
Hamdi Efendi	7	51
Azem Efendi	7	51
Halil Efendi	7	49
Maksud Efendi	9	48
Hamdi Efendi	6	49
Rrustem Efendi	6	47
Habib Efendi	6	47
Bejtullah Efendi	8	45
Sadri Efendi	9	No grade / fail
Hasan Efendi	9	No grade / fail
Rexhep Efendi	6	No grade / fail
Sabahat Hanim	7	31
Ramize Hanim	7	Not present for exams
Hubshah Hanim	8	Not present for exams
Nurije Hanim	9	Not present for exams
Vahide Hanim	8	Not present for exams
Fahrije Hanim	8	Not present for exams
Refiqe Hanim	7	Not present for exams

Students in the Conservative Class				
Student name	Age	Ottoman ABCs (reading primer)	Writing of Turkish language	Overall success
Ismail Efendi	5	10	10	20
Bejtullah ef.	7	10	10	20
Ismail ef.	7	10	9	19
Bejtullah ef.	6	8	9	17

Zejnullah ef.	6	8	9	17
Zarife Hanim	8	9	9	18
Salime Hanim	7	7	8	15
Hadixhe Hanim	6	8	6	14
Nurije Hanim	5	7	6	13
Malike Hanim	8	5	7	12
Fatime Hanim	5	5	6	11
Habibe Hanim	5	5	5	10
Rukije Hanim	5	5	4	09
Nazlije Hanim	7	3	4	07

Conclusion

The data regarding the Ottoman *salnames* from the Vilayets and the salnames of the Ministry of Education have the character of annual reports on the number of students, professors, and any information on the *maktab* donors, year of establishment, and construction cost. The data from the Salnames for 1900 show the *Kaza* of Gjilan to have had nine active schools, of which one madrasa had 60 students, one *ruşdiye maktab* had 40 students, three *ibtidaiye maktab*s had 300 students, two girls *maktab*s had 75 students, and one Christian *maktab* had 82 students (52 girls and 30 boys). Outside of the *salname*, the area had 45 active *maktab*s, with 35 *maktab*s enrolling 1,086 students, and the number of students for the remaining 15 *maktab*s being unknown/not recorded.

The transcripts we received provide new information regarding the students' identities, the curriculum, and the grading system. Among these data, the 1902/1903 school year shows the village of Llashtica to have had 31 students attend classes, of whom 14 were in the first class, 11 in the second class, and six in the third class. The *maktab* in Remnik (a village near Gjilan) had 24 students, of whom 11 were in the first class, nine in the second class, and four in the third class. The *maktab* in Reka (Pidiç) had 18 students, of whom nine were in the first class, six in the second class, and three in the third class. The *maktab* in Caravajka had a total of 15 students, of whom seven were in the first class, five in the second class, and three in the third class. The *maktab* in Pogragja for the 1905/1906 school year had four classes. The first class taught 22 students aged 6-12; the second class taught eight students aged 7-13, and the third class taught eight students aged 7-12. In addition, the *şube şakirdâni* [parallel students] class as the fourth

class enrolled 12 students aged 5-8 and was taught according to the old system (conservative/Ulama). Based on the attendance and enrollment of students, the elementary education is seen to have had a larger number of students, which means the interest was constantly increasing from year to year for this style of education and training.

The records from the *maktab* in the village of Pogragja reveal the divisions and parallels that had been included into the whole Ottoman society in the time of the Tanzimat. This parallelism was also emphasized in Pogragja, where in addition to *ibtidaiye maktab*'s reformed classes, a parallel class also was present that had developed teaching using the old system. When comparing the number of conservative parallel students to the number of students in the reformed first class, the first class, which had developed teaching in accordance with the reform, was seen to be twice as large as that of the conservative parallel students. Despite this, the non-participation of girls in the exams in the first class reveals something about the approach these students' parents had toward the new curriculum.

Appendix

Table 1. *List of Exam Results of Students from the Ibtidaiyye Maktab in the Village of Llashtica, Nahiye of Karadak in the Kaza of Gjilan Affiliated with the Sanjak of Prishtina, Vilajet of Kosovo. School Year 1902/1903 (BOA. MF.IBT: 103/7, 14 Temmuz 1318/27 August 1902):*

Third Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Salih Efendi, son of Arif Aga	13	72
Salih Efendi, Son of Hajdar	14	71
Shevki Efendi, son of Banush	15	71
Abdulhalim Efendi, son of Halit	12	70
Selim Efendi, son of Ahmed	14	66
Ismail Efendi, son of Mulla Rashit	13	65

Second Grade		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Ejub Efendi, son of Emin	13	56

Omer Efendi, son of Bajram	15	55
Azem Efendi, son of Adem	14	54
Jusuf Efendi, son of Banush	12	53
Ramazan Efendi, son of Mahmud	15	52
Abdulhalim Efendi, son of Ahmed	13	51
Esat Efendi, son of Hajdar	14	50
Hajriz Efendi, son of Hasan	15	49
Akif Efendi, son of Sinan	14	48
Regep Efendi, son of Ahmed	12	47
Ismail Efendi, son of Mustafa	15	46

First Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Halim Efendi, son of Hazir Aga	12	32
Halil Efendi, son of Ahmed	14	31
Rifat Efendi, son of Mustafa	13	30
Qahil Efendi, son of Zahir	15	29
Ismail Efendi, son of Halim	15	28
Abdul Efendi, son of Ramadan	14	27
Xhemail Efendi, son of Hajredin	12	26
Shaban Efendi, son of Xhemail	13	26
Sadik Efendi, son of Zenun	14	25
Fetah Efendi, son of Halim	13	24
Zejnol Efendi, son of Omer	15	24
Rashid Efendi, son of Halit	14	23
Shaban Efendi, son of Azem	13	22
Husejn Efendi, son of Ismail	15	22

Table 2. List of Exam Results of Students from the Ibtidaiyye Maktab of Remnik Village in Karadak in the Kaza of Gjilan Affiliated with the Sanjak of Prishtina of the Vilajet of Kosovo. School Year 1902/1903 (BOA. MF.IBT. 122 / 103.08, 12 Temmuz 1318/26 August 1902)

Third Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects

Abdullah Efendi, son of Tahir	15	90
Hamit Efendi, son of Qerim	16	88
Hajrullah Efendi, son of Ali	13	86
Bajram Efendi, son of Musli	14	84

Second Class

Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 7 subjects
Hajrullah Efendi., son of Shehab	13	70
Bahtjar Efendi, son of Ali	14	69
Shaban Efendi, son of Maliq	13	68
Halim Efendi, son of Adem	12	67
Hamdi Efendi, son of Abdurrahim	14	66
Numan Efendi, son of Sefie	15	65
Ramadan Efendi, son of Hasan	14	64
Qerim Efendi, son of Sylejman	13	63
Edhem Efendi, son of Qerim	14	61

First Class

Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 4 subjects
Shuajb (Shaip) Efendi, son of Islam	13	40
Shaban Efendi, son of Maliq	12	39
Osman Efendi, son of Bislim	13	38
n/a ⁵ son of Halil	14	37
Zejnel Efendi, son of Shehab	12	36
Ali Efendi, son of Vejsel	13	25
Beqir Efendi, son of Ajet	14	34
Jakup Efendi, son of Ibrahim	13	34
Abdullah Efendi, son of Bejazit	12	34
Kadri Efendi, son of Ramadan	14	33
Ali Efendi, son of Shaban	13	32

5 Name was missing.

Table 3. List of Exams of the Students of Ibtidaiyye Maktab from the Village Ceravajkë, Karadak in the Kaza of Gjilan Affiliated with the Sanjak of Prishtina of the Vilajet of Kosovo. School Year 1902/1903 (BOA. MF.IBT.122 / 103.10, 11 Temmuz 1318/ 24 August 1902)

Third Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 9 subjects
Abdylatif Efendi, son of Ali	14	90
Bektash Efendi, son of Arif	15	89
Rexhep Efendi, son of Ali	16	88

Second Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 7 subjects
Idris Efendi, son of Ali	13	70
Idris Efendi, son of Veli	12	68
Ismaili Efendi, son of Ali	14	67
Numan Efendi, son of Jahja	15	66
Numan Efendi, son of Hasan	13	65

First Class		
Name of Student and Father	Age	Overall success in 4 subjects
Jahja Efendi, son of Ajet	13	40
Zulfi Efendi., son of Ajet	12	39
Ibrahim Efendi, son of Zahir	14	39
Arsllan Efendi, son of Bajram	13	35
Xhelaledin Efendi, son of Zeqir	15	34
Abdi Efendi, son of Ajet	12	33
Ibrahim Efendi, son of Ahmet	13	32

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کتابخانه

ردیف	اسم	تاریخ	محل	ملاحظات
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The European Union's Political Membership Criteria and Their Effects on Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Danijela Dudley, Fleurine Saez

Abstract: While the European Union's accession criteria have served as a driving force in promoting democracy throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has lagged behind other countries in the region in its efforts to achieve EU accession. Despite the incentives of potential EU membership, BiH continues to struggle with completing its democratic transition and consolidation. With three ethnic groups challenging the legitimacy of the state, progress has been hindered by contested authority, control over the decision-making process, and uncertainty about others' intentions. By prioritizing the need for institutional reforms that would grant state institutions power over entities and demanding both policy coordination among entities as well as standardization of legislation across the country, the EU has not diminished these inter-ethnic fears. As a result, while widespread consensus exists in the country that international integration is desirable, progress has been restrained by continued uncertainty of what such integration would entail for the current consociational arrangement and each group's ability to regulate its own affairs.

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union, membership criteria, post-conflict democratization



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Introduction

Over the past three decades, the European Union's (EU) accession criteria have served as a driving force in promoting democracy throughout Central and Eastern Europe. By attempting to satisfy the EU's membership conditions, former communist countries have been incentivized to establish stable democratic institutions and improve their human rights practices. New member and candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Balkans in particular, have experienced varying levels of success. In comparison to other countries in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has lagged behind in its efforts to approach the prospect of becoming an EU member state. Unlike other former Yugoslav states, which have either joined the EU or are engaged in accession negotiations, BiH has yet to accomplish significant political reforms on its path to a democratic transition and consolidation in order to receive the status of an EU candidate country. The question is why the EU's membership criteria have failed to match BiH's political reforms to that of other former Yugoslav states. We argue that the incompatibility of EU-driven reforms and the nature of BiH's post-war arrangement have delayed the country's progress and hindered its prospects for EU membership.

The Bosnian conflict of the 1990s ended with the establishment of a decentralized state system, which would preserve the unity of the state in conjunction with power-sharing arrangements but allow each of the three constituent peoples significant levels of autonomy. While this arrangement was intended to overcome the wartime divisions, at the same time it legitimized internal disunity and allowed ethnic tensions to continue dominating the country's post-war political agenda. With each side continuing to challenge the legitimacy of the state, the incentives to establish democratic institutions have been overshadowed by each ethnic group's fears of the other groups' future intentions. In this environment of contested authority, the EU's demands for political reform have been counterproductive. Namely, while formally accepting BiH's decentralized system, the EU's demands for reform have at the same time centered around an institutional restructuring that would grant state institutions power over the entities, coordinate policies among the entities, and standardize legislation across the country. If implemented, these reforms would threaten the very arrangement that has kept the country together since the wars of the 1990s, and the prospects of these reforms have intensified the already existing inter-ethnic distrust. As a result, while widespread consensus exists in the country regarding the desirability of a democratic transition and

international integration, any significant progress has been hindered by the continuing challenges to the legitimacy of the state as well as uncertainty about what such an integration would entail both for the current consociational arrangement and each ethnic group's ability to regulate its own affairs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's Post-War Structure

After declaring independence from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, BiH experienced a war that brought its three constituent peoples, the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, into conflict with one another. The nearly four-year war ended in 1995 with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995) in BiH. Shaped largely by the international community, the Dayton Agreement represented a skilled attempt at balancing the need to preserve the integrity of BiH as a unified state with the need to ensure that the three previous enemy groups could live with one another. As Holbrooke representing the United States in the peace process emphasized, while finding an arrangement that would facilitate the three sides' coexistence within the boundaries of one state was challenging, preserving a unified multiethnic state and simultaneously not legitimizing Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing were also necessary (Holbrooke, 1999:97). To achieve both goals, the international community crafted a political structure that relied on decentralization and power-sharing for its functioning.

BiH's post-war political arrangement was in large part founded on the idea of consociationalism, which is advantageous for diverse societies according to Lijphart (1969, 1977). Lijphart (1977) recommended that heterogeneous societies, especially those without cross-cutting cleavages, establish political structures that would include all groups at the highest levels of the decision-making process, allow minority groups to veto decisions of vital interest, proportionally distribute resources and positions, and permit each side to make autonomous decisions on issues concerning the ethnic groups' internal affairs. In BiH, which was in a way "a classic example of consociational settlement" (Bose, 2002:216), this arrangement was indented to make the re-unified country governable following the war that had alienated its constituent groups. It materialized in the country dividing into semi-autonomous entities as well as distributing the powers and positions equally among the three ethnic groups. To ensure significant levels of autonomy for each group, the country was internally divided into two entities:

a Serb entity called the Republika Srpska (RS) and a Bosniak-Croat entity called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)¹³ alongside the autonomous district of Brčko. The Federation itself was envisioned as a decentralized entity of Croats and Bosniaks consisting of ten cantons. Each entity has its own governing structure that allows the constituent groups to maintain high levels of autonomy while remaining physically separated from one another.

The Dayton Agreement also created a convoluted institutional structure in which most public offices included representatives from all three ethnic groups and divided powers equally among them. This is most pronounced at the state level where the three constituent peoples are represented equally in each institution. For instance, a tripartite presidency with a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb member heads the state, while the House of Peoples consists of five representatives from each ethnic group. Although established with the goal of providing equal representation for each of the three groups and making a deeply divided country governable, this structure almost ensured gridlock by necessitating a three-sided compromise for every decision.

In addition to the complications introduced by the need for a three-sided compromise, BiH's post-war constitution²⁴ also stripped the state government of most of the political authority central governments generally have. According to the peace agreement, the central government's jurisdiction extended to only 10 policy areas (e.g., foreign policy, customs policy, air traffic control), with most other areas being left to the entities to regulate. This intentionally created weak government (Soberg, 2008) was in line with the international community's desire to afford each group significant levels of autonomy but resulted in a perpetual gridlock that has necessitated the international community's heavy-handed intervention to accomplish any reforms. Namely, the Dayton agreement charged international authorities with direct oversight over the implementation of the peace agreement. While the military terms of the agreement were originally assigned to a NATO-led military Implementation Force,³⁵ civilian elements

1 The terminology of 'republic' and 'federation' in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unconventional. Commonly the terms republic and federation denote sovereign states but in the case of BiH both terms are used to name the state's sub-national entities. Thus, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) are constitutive elements of the country/state of BiH.

2 The Constitution of BiH was embedded in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4.

3 IFOR was replaced by NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996, which was further replaced by a European Union Peacekeeping Force (EUFOR, Operation Althea) in 2004.

of the treaty were left to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation (General Framework Agreement, 1995). Both the lack of consensus and the inability of the three constituent groups to come to an agreement on most issues led to the OHR's continuous involvement in the decision-making process. In fact, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) repeatedly instructed the High Representative to take charge in the decision-making process and to impose decisions if BiH's political elites were unable to reach a compromise (PIC, 1997, 2000). Faced with obstinate political elites, the OHR imposed decisions even on sensitive issues such as national symbols and laws regulating citizenship; it annulled entities' legislation that conflicted with the state constitution, removed officials from power, and more.⁴⁶

This complex institutional arrangement has been the source of both stability and stalemate. The relative autonomy of the three sides has allowed the country to maintain peaceful relations and avoid any internal turmoil that would threaten the peace and stability of the country. The core logic of the consociational arrangement has been accomplishing its goal: The three sides have been able to regulate their affairs and safeguard their self-rule because of institutional arrangements that allow them to preserve relative independence. At the same time, however, the weak central government and equal division of political offices among the three constituent peoples have prevented meaningful reform and democratization of the system. With each side prioritizing its narrow interests, the decisions center around finding the lowest common denominator, and any attempts at substantive reform are stymied by internal divisions and conflicts.

European Union Membership Aspirations

The expansion of the EU and inclusion of countries from the former communist bloc has been guided by a set of membership criteria established during a European Council (1993) meeting. The leaders of EU member states determined that states aspiring to join the union would have to be democratic, have a functioning free market economy, and align their legislation and practices to EU standards (European Council, 1993). The Commission has since used this broad framework to prepare prospective members and evaluate their readiness for EU membership. Potential members initially go through

⁴ For a complete list of decisions imposed by the Office of the High Representative, see <http://www.ohr.int/decisions-of-the-high-representative/>

an association process that focuses on political and economic conditions and evaluates countries' preparedness to start working on the *acquis*; after basic political and economic reforms have been accomplished, countries are granted candidate status and enter the accession process. The countries of the Western Balkans have faced additional requirements outlined in stabilization and association agreements that, in addition to political and economic terms, require them to stabilize regional relations and cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The association process has been particularly tumultuous in the case of BiH, as it is the only western Balkan country besides Kosovo that has yet to achieve the status of candidate country.

Although BiH was identified as a potential EU candidate country as early as 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003; European Council, 2003), little progress in its accession process has been made so far. In a 2003 Feasibility Study, the Commission identified key reforms necessary for BiH to prepare for entering into a stabilization and association agreement (SAA) with the EU (European Commission, 2003). While acknowledging that BiH's constitution had formally set up a democratic framework, the Commission noted a number of deficiencies in the country's governance, human rights practices, and judiciary, recognizing the long road ahead before BiH may be ready to enter into a stabilization agreement. Although SAA negotiations were officially initiated in November 2005 and the agreement was signed in 2008, it did not enter into force until 2015 (European Union, 2015), a full decade after negotiations had started. In early 2016, BiH submitted the application for EU membership, but it has yet to become a candidate country.

Considering the EU's previous relative successes in promoting democracy through accession conditionality, nearly two decades of negotiations and close work with BiH would reasonably be expected to at least lead to modest levels of improvement in the country's democratic practices. BiH, however, is a stark departure from the norm. Despite the country's desire to join the EU and apparent attempts to satisfy accession conditions, BiH has not made significant progress on its path to democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit's (2020) Democracy Index has continuously placed BiH in the hybrid category, with BiH's scores actually decreasing over the last several years. Likewise, Freedom House's (2020) Nations in Transit Reports show inadequate democratic

reform across a range of categories, with the overall democracy percentage dropping from 47% in 2005 to just under 39% in 2020.

This lack of progress is most obviously reflected in the country's current human rights record and ongoing obstacles to inclusive political participation. In addition to direct and indirect discrimination (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2019, 2021) as well as frequent hate crimes (United States Department of State, 2020), numerous political and legal barriers restrict individuals' ability to participate in the country's political process and exercise rights and freedoms associated with democratic governance. Due to the structure of the country's electoral system, minority groups do not hold seats in state parliament and are severely underrepresented at all levels of decision-making.⁵⁷ These manifestations of BiH's nondemocratic system have persisted and at times intensified throughout the country's bid for membership in the EU.

The EU has repeatedly noted these shortcomings. For instance, the Commission's 2015 Bosnia progress report (European Commission, 2015) was mostly critical of BiH's lack of meaningful political reforms. It noted severe inadequacies in BiH's progress toward democratic governance, with only modest levels of preparation in the area of judiciary and public administration and no preparation in the area of human rights or protection of minorities. The report also noted that, instead of improving, the situation in some policy areas such as freedom of expression had been deteriorating, with not only the intimidation of media representatives having had increased but also legislation having recently been passed in Republika Srpska that threatened to restrict freedom of expression even further (European Commission, 2015:22). Despite the Commission's critical assessment, BiH submitted the application for EU membership the following year. Such a move was clearly premature, as the country's unwillingness to implement the necessary reforms has resulted in a lack of candidacy status. The European Commission's (2019b:12-13) 2019 opinion of the country's readiness for EU membership emphasized that "considerable and sustained efforts are needed for the country to be able to assume the obligations of EU membership" and concluded that in no policy areas did the country have good levels of preparation or was "well advanced regarding its capacity to undertake the obligations stemming from EU membership."

⁵⁷ In a 2018 case filed by the president of a local multiethnic party because of her inability to run and vote in Mostar's municipal elections, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that BiH must amend its electoral laws ("Baralija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina," 2019).

Resistance to Reform

The lack of progress in integration efforts and the country's inability (or unwillingness) to satisfy the conditions established by the EU are the product of BiH's internal divisions, formally institutionalized in its constitution. The decentralized governing structure with a weak central authority, the blurred and overlapping competencies among different levels of government, the existence of blocking mechanisms to protect each group's interests, and the ethnicity- and entity-based voting and public office distribution have all created conditions under which the state cannot act as one unit. This division-reinforcing structure has not only precluded major reforms but has also stifled the country's ability to execute even simple tasks such as agreeing on how to respond to all the questions in a questionnaire from the European Commission (2019b). Given that the current convoluted constitutional structure of overlapping competences prevents BiH's ability to act as a single state, the EU has insisted since the start of negotiations on a more centralized state structure with political power increasingly vested at the central level. In one of its earlier assessments of BiH's political situation, the European Commission emphasized the need for Bosnian politicians to take charge of their country's governing process, "as only coherent, functioning states can successfully negotiate an agreement with the EU" (European Commission, 2003:14). That approach from the EU, however, has hindered the country from accomplishing consequential reforms, as any attempt to increase competencies of the central government or affect each group's level of influence on the decision-making process threatens the autonomy of the three constituent groups and the sense of safety each has due to their autonomy. As a result, the country has been much more willing to implement economic and political reforms that do not affect the existing inter-ethnic power relations and much less compliant in implementing reforms that threaten the current consociational arrangement.

While formally accepting BiH's decentralized structure, the EU has repeatedly demanded changes in the country's existing power sharing structure. Although individually the two entities have made efforts to amend their legislation to meet EU standards, the major hurdle remains at the state level. The lack of clarity regarding competences and continuous uncoordinated approaches to policymaking between the state-level parliamentary assembly, the entity parliaments, and the state-level Council of Ministers are a major area of concern for the EU. The Commission has pushed for improved cooper-

ation between them in order for BiH to harmonize its legislation with that of the EU. The lack of communication among different levels of government and their inability “to ensure a harmonised and EU-compatible approach” (European Commission, 2013:11) have prevented the country from successfully cooperating with the EU and satisfying the current membership criteria. However, political reforms that could address these issues in a meaningful way would clash with the current constitutional framework, would require a restructuring of the power-sharing system, and at the same time would diminish the autonomy of the three ethnic groups to regulate their affairs. As a result, the EU’s demands for a clear delineation of competences along with the creation of a clause that would enable the state to “temporarily exercise competences of other levels of government to prevent serious breach of EU law” (European Commission, 2019a:13) have resulted in little tangible progress.

Similarly, the EU’s push for political representation of all Bosnian citizens, especially minorities, has faced opposition because of its effects on the entrenched power-sharing structures. In practice, ethnic- and residence-based representation effectively prevents portions of the population from participating in the democratic process. The preamble to the constitution defines Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as “constituent peoples,” while citizens belonging to the country’s 17 minority groups are referred to as “others.” Members of minority groups are not eligible to run for the office of the presidency or the House of Peoples (Articles 4 and 5), because seats in each are reserved for equal representation of the three constituent groups. By some estimates, this provision has resulted in a total of 400,000 Bosnian citizens (approximately 12% of the population) being barred from office on the basis of their ethnic identity, religion, or place of residence (Human Rights Watch, 2019). In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that BiH’s current constitution violates minority rights, as the constitutional provisions covering election laws were in direct violation of Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and Protocol Number 12, which prohibit discrimination based on race, religion, and association with a national minority (Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009). Since then, a number of other court cases have followed suit (Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016; Šlaku v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016; Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014). The EU’s demands that the constitution be amended to ensure inclusive representation has been unsuccessful be-

cause any changes to the current arrangement could result in a loss of guaranteed representation for the three ethnic groups.

Another problematic feature of ethnic power guarantees has been entity voting in the Parliamentary Assembly, which requires a two-thirds vote from each entity's delegates to pass a decision. This is a mechanism that allows entity delegates to block legislation which they view as going against their entity's core interests. While entity voting is intended as a protection mechanism for each group's interests, it has long been abused by those seeking to exclusively advance their ethnic agendas (Bahtić-Kunrath, 2011). As such, entity voting poses a significant challenge to inter-ethnic cooperation. The EU has demanded modifications to entity voting due to its negative effects over the parliament's functioning by completely delaying the adoption of legislation and reforms (European Commission, 2009, 2019b). However, reforming entity voting would reduce each ethnic group's ability to control outcomes. As a result, an early attempt at constitutional reform failed in part because representatives from Republika Sprska had "entered the negotiations under condition that Bosnia's division into entities would not be on the table, nor would the 'entity voting system' in the House of Representatives be discussed -- even though these two aspects of Bosnia's post-war set-up had been identified by most independent observers as among Dayton's key deficiencies" (Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, 2006, Art. 4.28).

While progress in satisfying EU integration conditions has been slow in areas that may affect the consociational arrangement and the balance of powers that have been established, BiH has made significant policy changes in areas that do not directly touch upon the country's power-sharing structure. In 2010, the government successfully met 174 of the conditions set out in the European Commission's 2008 Roadmap for visa liberalization, resulting in visa-free travel to the Schengen area (European Commission, 2019a). And while the country has yet to successfully establish a fully functioning market economy, significant progress has been made to align its economic policies to EU standards. Following the signing of the 2008 Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues, progressive trade liberalization has taken place. This has led to considerable levels of integration among the economies of BiH, the EU, and neighboring countries (European Commission, 2019a:6). BiH has also successfully passed legislation regulating labor and the financial sector in line with international standards

(European Commission, 2019a:72). Another significant success in conforming to the standards set by the EU was achieved with reforms on tax and customs policies. While the Dayton Peace Agreement did leave certain competencies regarding internal market policies (e.g., raising taxes, customs administration) to the entities rather than the state, subsequent harmonization of the indirect taxation system along with the creation of a single customs administration were a testament to the leadership's readiness to "relinquish power in the name of European integration" (Noutcheva, 2012:68).

Support for European Integration

BiH's continued resistance to reforms is in contrast to its overall support for European integration. Bosnian citizens have continuously shown interest in EU accession and the democratic reforms which it entails. Positive sentiments towards EU membership have steadily increased since 2015: Between 2015-2019, around 70% of the population remained in favor of accession (National Democratic Institute, 2019; Outbox Consulting, 2019). Of the three ethnic groups, Bosnian Serbs have been the most skeptical of the EU and its effects on the country due to the view that EU accession "could jeopardise the existence of the RS" (Turčilo, 2013). Despite this skepticism, The Gallup Balkan Monitor (2010,:11) results show respondents in the RS to have begun viewing EU accession as an increasingly positive matter between 2008-2010. More recent surveys have demonstrated Bosnian Serbs strongly support EU accession (National Democratic Institute, 2018, 2019).

Public support for European integration presents a paradox: Bosnians aspire to join the EU while simultaneously wanting to preserve the current decentralized decision-making process that must be reformed to meet EU conditions. These contradictions are evident in public officials' inconsistent statements and actions. Republika Srpska has at times felt its Serbian identity to have been disproportionately threatened by both BiH authorities and the EU's proposed reforms, such as the European Union Police Mission's attempts at police reform in the early 2000s (Muehlmann, 2008). As a result, Milorad Dodik, the chair of BiH's tripartite presidency, renewed threats for the secession of the Republika Srpska in February 2020, claiming that the country's political crisis would "only disappear when Bosnia disappears" (*Euronews & Associated Press*, 2020). This is in contrast to his earlier statements expressing his entity's commitment to joining the EU (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2019).

Even Bosniak and Croat officials who have formally expressed less resistance to reforms have failed to support meaningful changes. Bakir Izetbegović, the Bosniak member of the fifth and sixth BiH presidency, expressed support for transferring power to the central government, despite acknowledging that doing so is not in the best interest of his constituents. Nevertheless, he has voiced skepticism in BiH politicians' ability to reach an agreement with regards to significant constitutional reforms (Izetbegović, 2016). In his 2016 speech to the European Parliament, Izetbegović (2016) explicitly stated that such reforms were "neither desirable nor doable at this moment." While acknowledging the "existing systemic discrimination against citizens" in Bosnia, Željko Komšić (2019a), the Croat member of the Presidency, at the same time made it clear that Bosnia would have to "undergo a process of maturation in order to reach such a political level that those necessary reforms can be implemented without major socio-political strains." There have been few signs of said maturation. Therefore, progress has unsurprisingly been scarce, as the packages of proposed constitutional reforms have often been rejected.

Reconsidering the Approach

BiH is not an outlier in its resistance to complying with the EU's membership conditions, as candidate countries have often flaunted the union's demands for political reform. As several scholars have demonstrated, the domestic costs of compliance will often dictate the extent to which EU-driven reforms are implemented (Schimmelfennig, 2008; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Tomić, 2013; Vachudova, 2005). When the EU-required reforms threaten domestic political elites' positions, these elites will unlikely be willing to give up their hold on power in exchange for the prospects of EU membership. As Tomić (Tomić, 2013:77) stated, "For conditionality to be successful, the promised reward needs to be greater than the cost of fulfilling the condition of the reward." In BiH, not only would political leaders endanger their own political survival by reforming the system in line with EU demands, but flaunting EU conditions occasionally gives them an additional boost of popularity and support among the public. According to Džihic and Wieser (Džihic and Wieser, 2011:1822), "Political leaders find stirring up ethno-national passions more profitable than progressing on EU requested reforms," in part because successful resistance to the EU-driven reforms that might endanger ethnic autonomy frames the officials as

defenders of national interests and ultimately benefits them at the polls. As those authors demonstrated, this was the outcome of the failed attempts to achieve the police and constitutional reforms in the 2000s, and the cycle is likely to continue repeating as long as the EU puts the core of the country's power-sharing arrangement on trial.

The cost-benefit calculation of the price domestic leadership may pay and the gain that may be achieved though compliance is further complicated in BiH because many required reforms directly clash with national identity issues. When the EU's criteria collide with national identity, the potential benefit of membership in the union may not be as valuable as preserving and defending that identity (Freyburg & Richter, 2010; Stahl, 2013; Tomić, 2013). This is especially pronounced in BiH, where the history of conflict and hostility has resulted in a deeply divided society characterized by continuous challenges to state legitimacy and constant fears among the three ethnic groups regarding the other groups' intentions (Dudley, 2016). The EU's focus on institutional restructuring that would establish formal democratic structures disregards the fact that such structures alone may not be enough to lead to democracy in a deeply divided state. As a result, BiH's and the EU's political leaderships are clearly not in an agreement regarding what is functional and desirable for the country (Anastasakis, 2008).

The literature on democratic transition and consolidation has long emphasized the importance of national unity for successful democratization and the challenges that divided societies face when attempting to democratize. Dankwart Rustow (Rustow, 1970:350) argued one necessary prerequisite to democracy to be "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to." According to Robert Dahl (Dahl, 1989:207), "*The criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not proper and rightful—if its scope or domain is not justifiable—then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedure*" (original emphasis). Similarly, Linz & Stepan (1996a:6; see also 1996) argued that "democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved" in some cases. According to those authors, while such a challenge to state legitimacy and lack of national unity presents a major obstacle to a democratic transition and consolidation, overcoming these are not necessarily impossible. In line with Lijphart's formula, Linz and Stepan (1996a, 1996b) recommended a number of decentralized power-sharing measures that would allow diverse identities to be protected and expressed, which greatly resembles the current arrangement in

BiH. While the EU has demonstrated inconsistent commitment to its own membership criteria, often to the detriment of democratic progress (Dudley, 2020; Stahl, 2013), the challenge in BiH is not the union's inconsistency but the nature of the demands that follow a one-size-fits-all formula for democracy. Continuous demands to reform the very structures that the literature recommends as crucial for democratization of divided societies may not just inhibit the process of accession to the EU but may also threaten the few elements of democracy that exist in BiH.

Conclusion

BiH's post-war institutional structure has made the country's governance challenging while at the same time has ensured the peaceful coexistence of the three constituent peoples by safeguarding each group's interests. Correcting all the shortcomings of BiH's political system, such as by empowering the central authority, halting ethnicity-based distribution of political offices, and eliminating entity voting, would most certainly impact the current power balance among the three main ethnic groups. The EU's constitutional reform demands have essentially attacked BiH's decentralized structure that has enabled the current power-sharing arrangement to function as is. For example, amending the constitution by dropping the entity-voting clause or enfranchising minorities politically would mean the end of Bosnian politics as we know it and would give the citizens who are considered the "others" significantly more say in decision making. More importantly, it would give reformist and multiethnic challengers a greater chance to gain power through elections. At the same time, it would also endanger each group's safety net that has kept the country together since the end of the war in the 1990s. Therefore, the EU's attempts to induce progress toward membership by reforming these structures have not surprisingly threatened these safeguards and consequently been met with resistance, despite officials' declared support for European integration and the realization that membership will not proceed without such reforms. When groups feel as though they are "losing according to the current rules of the game" (Perry & Keil, 2018:12, they reject reforms.

This incompatibility between the EU's demands and the country's needs have led to skepticism about the prospect of membership. While a large majority of the public looks forward to economic integration with the rest of Europe, many remain quite pessimistic as to if and when that day will come. When asked when they expected the ac-

cession of their economy to the EU to happen, 32% of the BiH participants projected the year 2030, and 29% said never (Outbox Consulting, 2019:39). The citizens are not the only ones doubting a positive outcome: Bosnian political leaders have also shown wariness towards EU officials. In 2019, Komšić (Komšić, 2019) accused EU officials, notably those from the European Commission, of holding Bosnia to a double standard while concluding that “with such a policy, the EU will not get a reliable partner in BiH, nor will BiH make any progress.” As Bieber (Bieber, 2011: 1785) argued, the EU must adapt its membership requirements to “the reality of minimalist states.”

The EU's efforts to bring about democratic changes in BiH have run counter to the recommendations of the literature on democratic transition and consolidation in divided societies. By focusing on the formal institutional elements of democracy while disregarding the specific circumstances that prevent those institutions from being established, the EU has once again demonstrated its preference of the letter of the law rather than its spirit. Even if established, formal democratic structures forced on a divided society would most likely exist in name only while maintaining their non-democratic substance in reality. By forcing reforms on the most sensitive aspects of BiH's system and failing continuously, the EU is missing an opportunity to use the carrot of potential membership to generate meaningful changes in areas where such changes are possible. Instead of taking a one-size-fits-all approach, the EU must recognize that its typical approach to inducing changes through conditionality does not work in a deeply divided society where reconciliation, trust, and sense of security are of vital importance.

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War Memorials and their Impact on Reconciliation: The Case of Vukovar

Blerta Ahmeti

Abstract: War memorialization initiatives recognize and preserve the occurrences of past suffering in societies emerging from violent conflict. Furthermore, an intrinsic association also exists between memorialization and the reconciliation. However, determining the contribution memorialization provides to the reconciliation process of the former parties in the conflict is debatable. This paper addresses memorialization initiatives as an important instrument for the reconciliation process. Specifically, it looks into the role of war memorialization in the town of Vukovar in Croatia with regard to the reconciliation process between Croats and Serbs there. Vukovar has a dense concentration of Croatian War of Independence (Homeland War) memorial centers and commemorative events. Vukovar's war memorialization alternatives exclude the remembrance of ethnic-Serb victims*, thereby hampering the reconciliation of the former adversarial parties in the town. More efforts must be invested in to ensure the memorialization of what the Serbians suffered.

Keywords: the past, memorials, victims, former conflicting parties, reconciliation.

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* The term victims and losses throughout the article refer to people killed during the Vukovar battle.

Introduction

Memorialization is a relatively new phenomenon in transitional justice. The International Centre for Transitional Justice defines memorialization as an essential component of the transitional justice approach (Bret et al., 2007). The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violation of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law emphasizes satisfaction as a form of reparations, a category under which memorials fall. According to Barsalou (2014:49), memorialization initiatives can be authentic sites at the locations where atrocities occurred such as graves; constructing sites as monuments, walls of names, and museums; and activities such as peace marches and temporary exhibits as commemorations.

Nowadays, memorials are found in post-conflict societies such as Rwanda, Cambodia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina, among others. Memorials are believed to play a quasi-judicial role in giving victims the sense that the truth about their past atrocities has been recognized (Hajayandi, 2014). On individual and societal levels, memorials may serve as adequate places for mourning (Buckley-Zistel & Schäfer, 2014:1). Furthermore, they may also be utilized as a tool for reconciliation in societies as they emerge from violent conflict (Kwon & Faust, 2006:120). However, any debate about the connection memorials have with reconciliation warrants explanation of the precise meaning of the notion of reconciliation. For some, reconciliation is construed as forgetting and forgiving, whereas others see it as a change of attitudes, beliefs, or relationships concerning a certain matter (Barsalou, 2014:54). The literature on post-conflict reconciliation also uses the term social reconstruction as a synonym for reconciliation (Weinstein & Stover, 2004:14).

The function of memorials in the context of reconciliation has been a subject of contention among transitional justice scholars. Some claim that memorials honor and remember the deceased, provide evidence of past atrocities, create official narratives, and increase emotional understanding (Buckley-Zistel & Bjorkdahl, 2017:254). In this way, memorials contribute to reinstating the relationships between the conflicting parties. For instance, the Rwandan High Commissioner has noted the memorial sites across the country to have supported reconciliation (McCan, 2013). Others such as Rieff (2016)

argue that memorials do not necessarily contribute to reconciliation but instead have the potential to deepen the division between the former adversaries as well as keep the wounds alive, such as happened in the Balkans and Northern Ireland.

To explore whether memorials support post-conflict reconciliation, this paper focuses on the case of Vukovar, a town in Croatia. Vukovar represents an interesting case study for analysis because it has the densest concentration of memorials and memorial centers to the Homeland War.

The article examines how the memorialization initiatives regarding Vukovar's war have impacted the reconciliation between Croats and Serbs in the town. This paper defines reconciliation as the process of restoring friendly relations (Staub, 2000:376) between former opposing parties. Do Vukovar Serbs and Croats acknowledge the past wrongs and accept each other or do they still consider each other as opponents? The paper supports the argument that having each party to the conflict determining the truth about the past (Kriesberg, 2007:89) and acknowledge it (Govier, 2009:38) is necessary for reconciliation.

The study argues the Vukovar's war memorialization initiatives to have hampered the reconciliation between Croats and Serbs in the town due to Serb losses being excluded from the memorialization.

The paper begins by outlining some key points about the war in Vukovar. The second section discusses the memorialization of the Vukovar battle victims as a crucial component for the transitional justice process. Next, it elaborates upon the war memorialization sites and commemorative events and their impact on the reconciliation process between Croats and Serbs in the town.

Vukovar's Past

Vukovar is a town in eastern Croatia, close to the border of Serbia. Croats and Serbs have always been the two main ethnic groups in the town. They had had good friendly relations until the Homeland War began in 1991. During the war, Vukovar was surrounded by the Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitary forces and were supported by the local Serbs of Vukovar for three months (Vukovar fell in November 1991). Vukovar's citizens experienced immense suffering. Overall, 3,000 people died during the battle. According to the present and doubtlessly incomplete records from the Croatian

Memorial Documentation Centre of the Homeland War, 350 Vukovar Serbs died in the battle, and 57 went missing. The final losses on the Serbian side during 1991, particularly in the battle of Vukovar, have yet to be ascertained on the basis of source documentation (Živić & Ružić, 2013). Apparently, Croatia suffered heavier fatalities. Aside from the extensive human suffering and losses, the vast majority of buildings in town were demolished, and thousands of non-Serbs were expelled (Kardov, 2004:229).

Although a large number of Serbs have abandoned Vukovar, Serbs together with Croats compose the two main ethnic groups in town. Today, 34% of the population are estimated to be Serbs, with the rest being Croatian (State Institute for Statistics of the Republic of Croatia, 2021). Ethnic division persists, and tensions continue to run high in the town.

Remembering the Battle of Vukovar: Reconciliation Challenges

Post-conflict reconciliation is a complex and multi-dimensional process consisting of various components. The literature suggests that reconciliation requires shared truths (Kriesberg, 2007:89) and acknowledgment (Govier, 2009:38) about the violent past. This means that the former adversaries must find some agreement on who the victims are and who is responsible for the victimization (Rosoux, 2015:17). This helps victims overcome their trauma and move on to some degree. However, considering that the parties of conflict always have opposing narratives about the past, accepting the truths remains a challenge.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the domestic courts in both Serbia and Croatia have established a factual record of what happened in Vukovar. Nonetheless, the records fail to be recognized and internalized by the Vukovar Serbs and Croats. The two communities in Vukovar also have confrontational views about who started the conflict in the 1990s (Ven, 2015), which is also an issue the ICTY has already clearly determined (Prosecutor V. Mile Mrksic et al., 2007).

Thus, the question that arises is how could these two groups restore their relationships when they do not agree on fundamental issues? The problem of opposing truths is exacerbated by the war memorialization initiatives in town. War memorialization in Vukovar is centered predominantly on the heroism of the fallen Croats soldiers and their

sacrifice for the Homeland War, as well as the civilians who died. The memorialization is manifested in diverse and ongoing commemorations events, memorials, and more. This fully reflects the Croatian war narrative by excluding the 300 Serb victims from remembrance (Cruvellier & Valinas, 2006:3), and putting collective guilt on the Serbs. As a result, mistrust has increased among the communities. George Santayana argued that “memory may almost become the art of continually varying and misrepresenting the past, according to one’s interests in the present” (O’Neill & Hilton, 2009:15). In the case of Vukovar, the historical facts about the Serbian losses are disregarded, with the Croats using memorialization initiatives as a powerful instrument to control the memory of the past by aiming to gain legitimacy and power. The marginalization of historical facts through memorials as a tool of transitional justice is contrary to reaching the goal of reconciliation, whereas reaching a consensus concerning the past crimes is a path toward reconciliation.

Croatian and Serbian suffering in Vukovar cannot be compared, due to the Serbian war losses being significantly smaller in scale. However, acknowledging the Serb victims must not be overlooked. Acknowledging and remembering the suffering and losses of both sides are acknowledged and remembered is crucial for Vukovar Croats and Serbs to have a good future. Only in this way can members of both communities feel involved and not left out.

Non-Inclusive Memorialization

Kandic emphasized that the war in Vukovar was a tragedy for all its citizens (as cited in Clark, 2013:24). The municipal authorities have erected several memorials in town in memory of the war.

Memorialization provides society with the opportunity to foster reconciliation, but in Vukovar, however, this opportunity has yet to be used adequately. Subsequently, such memorials remain contested by the Vukovar Serbs. The following elaborations of memorial sites depict the Croats’ lack of acknowledgement regarding Serb suffering.

One of the most famous monuments in town is the white cross in the center of town that was constructed in memory of all victims of war (Vukovar Tourist Board, n.d.). Nevertheless, one must note that the coat of arms of Croatia is engraved on the cross and emphasizes the Croatian suffering. This is an example of memorials being used

to portray the Croatian sacrifice and their triumph rather than to acknowledge the past (Cruvellier & Valinas, 2006:). Additionally, this symbol highlights the dominance Croats have in town, (Baillie, 2013, p. 8), which could also be perceived as a provocation to the local Serbian population. Important to note is that Croatian war veterans influenced the memorials' construction (Clark, 2013:125), thereby contributing to the one-sided remembrance. For instance, plaques with the inscriptions *Braniteljima Vukovara* [To the defenders of Vukovar] can be found in a few memorial landscapes as gifts from former Croatian combatants (Clark, 2013:125). Despite the evidence that approximately 6% of Vukovar Serbs had fought on the Croatian side during the war (Pilic, 2009), the term "defenders" only refers to the ethnic Croat veterans (Naef, 2013:2). This is because, according to the Croatian war narrative, the Serbs are collectively guilty of the atrocities committed during the Vukovar battle. This kind of distorted interpretation of the past promotes furthering the dominant Croatian narrative of the past in the Vukovar society, especially among the young generations. In addition, these memorials give a strong impression to outsiders that all the belligerents on the side of Croatia were ethnic Croats.

The situation is similar at many memorials. For instance, following the fall of Vukovar in November 1991, approximately 10,000 people were interned in the Velepromet camp, a warehouse. The victims were predominantly but not exclusively Croats. The co-president of the Croatian Association of Camp Inmates of Serbian Concentration Camps acknowledged that Serbs had also been imprisoned and mistreated in that camp (Rehak, 2008), yet the memorial of Velepromet's victims states, "At this place during the year of 1991, Croatian defenders, children, women, and the elderly of Vukovar were imprisoned, tortured, and killed." In this way, Vukovar's memorials have provided no room for Serb memories or experiences. The Vukovar Croats undeniably experienced greater losses than Vukovar Serbs; however, this must not be a justification to overlook the Serbian suffering. The way the past is remembered in Vukovar affects the political resentment and ethnic distance in the sense that it emphasizes not only Croatian victory, but also disregards remembrance of the victims from the Serbian side.

Another popular memorial is the Memorial Home Ovcara, which preserves the memory of at least 264 wounded Croat soldiers and civilians who had been taken from the hospital, then executed and buried in the Ovcara farm. It was the worst atrocity committed during the war in Croatia due to the vulnerability of the victims. The site provides a

multimedia exhibition of wartime events in the hospital, as well as pictures and names of the victims. The memorial's pamphlet states that non-Serbs had been executed by Serb aggressors in Ovčara (Clark, 2013:127). In this way, it fails to distinguish Serb civilians from Serb perpetrators and encourages the collective guilt of Serbs. In this way, the memorialization has been basically converted into the struggle for reconciliation.

The only memorial for Serbian victims known to exist is in a village near Vukovar. Serbs were discouraged to list the names of victims on it until 2011 due to the fear of attacks from Croats (Naef, 2013:13). Different groups must be allowed to take memory initiatives without being interrupted by the dominant groups (National Transitional Justice Working Group Zimbabwe, n.d). Still, Vukovar Serbs face challenges in commemorating their victims.

The examples set out above strongly support the argument that memorials in ethnically divided societies usually honor only a secluded ethnic group (Barsalou & Baxter, 2007:7), the Croats in this case.

After a conflict, societies are more divided than they had been; however, the way the past is remembered plays a crucial role in reconciliation (Buckley-Zistel, 2006). Tendencies to remember one group more than others deepen the division of former parties in conflict. Vukovar authorities should ensure memorialization initiatives that recognize and honor the victims of both sides. This idea is appraised by Serbs while strongly objected to by Croats (Clark, 2013:129). For instance, in 2016, the former Vukovar mayor refused to allow the erection of a memorial dedicated to Serbian victims (Telegraf, 2016).

Such memorials would eventually allow the suffering of both parties to be acknowledged as well as encourage dialogue and mutual respect between the two ethnic groups. Doing this might also open the way to facilitating the reconciliation process. The possibility of having an inclusive remembrance in Vukovar under these circumstances, however, remains open and questionable. Similar to the memorial sites, the commemoration events in Vukovar also emphasize Croatian victimhood while excluding Serbian losses.

Commemoration Practices

Vukovar Remembrance Day is marked annually on November 18. The commemoration program is organized by the municipal authorities and veterans' groups and last up to four days or longer. The program consists of various activities such as marches, conferences, and exhibitions. Homages are held in other parts of the country as well (*Croatia Week*, 2015).

Milosevic (2018) stated that commemoration initiatives encourage remembering the past and thereby contribute to keeping the wounds alive. This is what occurs in Vukovar. For instance, on the 20th anniversary of Vukovar's fall, Croatian Prime Minister Kosor emphasized that society must bond with the past to ensure that it is not forgotten (Clark, 2013:31). Similarly, media coverage constantly promotes this message (Vladislavljivic, 2019). The war events become a part of both individuals and the state and become unforgettable. Yet, too much emphasis on the past can prevent society from moving forward. Vukovar is also constantly commemorated at the international level. The Croatian representatives in the European Parliament present Vukovar as a victim of the two totalitarian regimes of communism and Serbian fascism (Milošević, 2017:900). As such they consider remembering Vukovar to be not important only for Croatia but also for all of Europe because of its contribution against totalitarianism (Milošević, 2017:900). Moreover, Vukovar is associated with Strasburg. Strasburg became a city of peace and reconciliation between France and Germany after World War II, and Vukovar is similarly presented as a "symbol of peace and reconciliation" in the Balkans (Milošević, 2017:900).

On the other hand, the commemoration of Serb victims in Vukovar consists of a small ceremony at the cemetery side of the town. Serbs do not visit Vukovar memorial sites and avoid participating in the commemorations (Naef, 2013:13). In addition, the ethnic division also remains stark in the educational system. Pupils in the Vukovar schools visit all the memorial sites apart from the Serbian ones to gain insight into the town's history (Ven, n.d.). On Vukovar's Remembrance Day, Serbs leave the town or stay inside (Naef, 2013:13). This is understandable in my view, because why would they attend commemoration ceremonies when they themselves are deprived of remembrance?

Excluding a certain group from the remembrance (in this case, the Serbs) can contribute to fueling renewed cycles of conflict (Ruwanpathirana, 2016:8). In Vukovar, a central subject that contributes to the way the past is remembered is the educational system. Serbian and Croat pupils go to separate schools and are taught different history lessons (Vladisavljevic, 2019). Croatian pupils learn about the past based on the Croatian narrative, whereas Serbian pupils have lessons grounded on their ethnic group's narrative. Hence, the conflicting history lessons promote further divisive versions of the past by strengthening the ethnic attitudes between both of Vukovar's ethnic communities. Furthermore, the official use of the Serbian script (i.e., Cyrillic) is banned by the town's council, in exemption to the towns State Minorities Law (Javanovic, 2015). Many Serbians and Croats work together in Vukovar, but their reconciliation is far off. The causes for the committed crimes and the suffering cannot be forgotten. Just as they have the right to remember, they also should be given the right to move on (Milosevic, 2018:63). Therefore, more balanced and inclusive memory initiatives would be a decisive step toward improving ethnic relations. Nevertheless, some progress must be noted as having been made in the relationships between Croatia and Serbia. A good example in this respect is the visit of Serbian President Tadic to the Ovcara memorial in 2011 and his apology for the crimes committed by Serbs (Tanjug, 2010). Both the Serb President Tadic and the Croatian President Josipovic have expressed willingness to re-establish relations between the two countries (Tanjug, 2010). Moreover, representatives of a Serbian non-governmental organization attended a commemoration ceremony in Vukovar in the same year (Milanovic, 2012:39). Nonetheless, these acts should be viewed with skepticism, because commemorations are often used as tools to achieve political goals rather than to actually offer homage to victims (Milanovic, 2012:5). At that time in 2011, Serbia and Croatia both needed to show their will to reconcile due to both countries' interests in accession to the European Union.

Finally, Vukovar's memorialization practices have contributed to greater awareness of the nexus between memorialization and reconciliation. What is perhaps important to note is that no perfect method exists for reconciliation (Bloomfield et al., 2003:13). Thus, one cannot expect memorials to be the panacea for reconciliation. In addition, different initiatives, measures, and contributions that deal with the past should be encouraged and supported, including but not limited to justice and accountability efforts and school book reforms. Lastly, each society should design reconciliation initiatives

based on their contexts. Any initiative to promote reconciliation must be carried out with caution and must involve members from all the affected groups.

Conclusion

Memorialization of the past is an essential element in the transitional justice approach. Memorialization initiatives are found in post-conflict societies around the world. Various post-conflict communities have demanded the erection of memorials in order to move on from the past (Hamber et al., 2010:397). Yet, whether or not memorialization initiatives support reconciliation efforts is a controversial matter. The elaborations in this paper show Vukovar's war memorialization to have hampered reconciliation between the Croats and Serbs there.

In Vukovar, war monuments and commemoration events are a source of collective memory that depict the heroism and victimhood of Croats while excluding Serbian losses from remembrance. Such a divisive memorialization not only strengthens the division between the two ethnic groups but also threatens their future relations.

Vukovar authorities must establish inclusive memorialization initiatives to ensure both side's losses are acknowledged. Only in this way can memorialization initiatives contribute to rebuilding friendly and neighborly relationships among the members of the two ethnic groups in town. Still, memorialization alternatives must be complemented with other measures such as justice and accountability efforts as well as school book reforms.

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book
reviews

Noel Malcolm's Useful Enemies: Islam and The Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450-1750

Oxford University Press, 2019, 487 pages

Reviewer: Omer Merzić

From the conflicts the Greek city states had with Darius I, Alexander the Great's conquest in the East, to the Muslim capture of the Iberian Peninsula and the subsequent Crusades on the Holy Lands, the West and the East have been at conflict with one another. This conflict has further extended with the arrival of one small beylik on the world map. This beylik grew into the future Ottoman Empire, which would become one of the major threats to Christian Europe for several centuries. From the times of the Greek city states to the Ottoman Empire and even today, the East-West divide and their cultural differences have been used as a driving force, whether to conquer the so-called barbarians' and bring culture to them or to convert the likewise so-called infidels and



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bring them to the right way of living. Both sides have used different narratives and developed their discourse to further their agenda. In the book *Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450-1750*, Noel Malcolm explores and contextualizes the different narratives and discourses created by diverse groups of intellectuals and other individuals in Christian Europe, which had anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim sentiments at its heart.

The author of this book is Noel Malcolm, senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He specializes in intellectual history of the early modern period and remains keen to study the history of Southeastern Europe. This book in particular expresses Noel's proficiency in his area of study, due to him having taken up the challenge of telling a story that lasted for three centuries, from the fall of Constantinople up until the 18th century. Because the theme of the book relies on telling and observing the evolution of Western thought regarding Islam and the Ottoman empire, that the book is arranged chronologically is only logical. This means that the chapters are arranged sequentially, going from one period to another and rarely skipping more than a few decades. For the most part, the chapters are focused on a movement or an idea dominant at a single point in time. Of course, a few chapters occur that do not follow this paradigm, and these chapters are usually only focused on one specific thinker and philosopher. For example, the Italian diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli, the Italian theologian Tommaso Campanella, and the French philosopher Montesquieu each receive their own chapter. Why these latter two philosophers were given their own chapters while leaving out other noteworthy authors is rather unclear. Nevertheless, *Useful Enemies* gives a rather extensive view on the topic, often providing ample room to some philosophers that are usually overlooked. This means that the book has a sizable bibliography mostly based on primary sources. On one hand, this gives the book much more content that is rarely available anywhere else and transforms this work into a sort of index of authors and their works. On the other hand, this makes the book somewhat overwhelming, especially to non-academic readers, as all of the footnotes referencing the original primary sources are in their original language, most commonly Latin or French.

As previously mentioned, *Useful Enemies* starts with the fall of Constantinople and its impact on Western countries and the Church. The hostile approach towards Islam and the Ottoman Empire was at an all-time high in this era. This hostility was supported by two connected factors. The first one was the astronomical rise and expansion of the

Ottoman Empire into Europe and its conquest of predominantly Christian countries, and the second was the way Christian theology greatly assisted anti-Ottoman sentiments. As the author points out, the theological and philosophical works created by Western thinkers contained some generally truthful notions but also encompassed numerous unsubstantiated rumors and stories. The fall of Constantinople only exacerbated the situation regarding the Western view on Islam and the Ottoman Empire, which at that time was viewed as a punishment sent by God for their wrongdoings. Some Western sources even give a positive view of the Ottoman Empire, but Malcom attributes this to a criticism of Christians by Christian theologians by means of elevating the Ottomans who were perceived as barbaric. This meant that Christians who had the God-given right to rule were being corrupted to the point where so-called non-believers had become better than them. After this, Noel deals with the relationship between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. This relationship was beneficial to the Habsburgs, hence the name of the book "*Useful Enemies*," even though the two empires would be entangled in numerous conflicts that would last for almost four centuries. During this time the Habsburgs used and often exaggerated the Ottoman threat to their advantage to better control the situation in their own empire. Of course, this approach by the Habsburgs and other Western empires and thinkers was prevalent during the height of the Ottomans, and as soon as they started to decline so did the paradigm change.

Some changes in the approach to the Ottomans came sooner than later once Protestantism began to take hold in Central and Western Europe. This new threat to the Catholic Church viewed the Ottomans more favorably than the Pope in Rome. Even Martin Luther saw the Ottomans to be more preferable than the Church, at least until the Ottomans besieged Vienna, after which Martin Luther perceived the Sultan as the devil incarnate. The author points out that the propaganda the Catholic Church made against the Ottomans was also used by the Protestants and aimed at the Catholic Church itself. The next chapter of the book deals with the alliance between the Ottomans and Christians, more specifically between France and the Ottoman Empire. This chapter is quite interesting, as Noel displays the different ways French scholars defended the alliance, which was not only politically but also culturally beneficial, due to authors from the West having had gained more opportunities to examine and study the Ottomans.

These new insights led to novel approaches to the Ottomans, most evident by the aforementioned Machiavelli and Campanella. Both sought to utilize the best qualities of

Islam and the Ottomans in the West's fight against them. This in fact resulted in the view on Islam and the Ottomans became more positive in some circles over time and to no longer only be shown as barbarians and savages, but rather as respectable advisors who every so often were better than several Christian rulers. Nevertheless, the notion that the Sultan was a despot who ruled not only his people but also had absolute control over their property and lives was established and lingered on for quite some time. This sentiment was carried by numerous authors up until and even during the Age of Enlightenment. The last pages of this book deal with Montesquieu's views and criticisms of Sultanic despotism, as well as Voltaire's disagreements with Montesquieu's views.

In the end, Malcolm concludes that "To study the history of Western ideas about Islam and the Ottoman Empire in this period may help us to understand some of the origins, or at least the development, of Western prejudices that have had long subsequent histories." The Western thinkers as well as early modern Europeans approached Islam and the Ottomans with a range of sentiments, "from fear and fierce disapproval to fascination, admiration, and envy." For many Western thinkers, the Ottoman Empire and Islam were useful not only as enemies or as others to be put in a subordinate place, but also as allies and a mirror to be used to self-criticize the West. In the end once the Ottoman threat started to diminish, another discourse in the form of Orientalism began to emerge.

Nevenka Tromp, Gjykimi i Papërfunduar i Sllobodan Millosheviçit

Shtëpia Botuese “Pema”, Prishtinë, 2021, fq. 490

Reviewers: Semran Murtezani, Ardita Ilazi

Nevenka Tromp si një nga prokuroret kryesore në ndjekjen penale të ish-udhëheqësit serb Sllobodan Millosheviçit në Tribunalin Penal Ndërkombëtar për ish-Jugosllavinë, përmes librit “Gjykimi i Papërfunduar i Sllobodan Millosheviçit” paraqet një gamë të jashtëzakonshme të njohurive për jetën dhe procesin gjyqësor të zhvilluar kundër Sllobodan Millosheviçit.

Shqyrtimi i detajuar i Nevenka Tromp për gjykimin e Sllobodan Millosheviçit thellohet në çështjet e së drejtës, akuzat ndaj tij për gjenocid, portretizimin e personalitetit, qëndrimin dhe deklaratat e tij. Sipas saj, seancat gjyqësore që kanë zgjatur plotë 466



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ditë, për një periudhe prej katër vitesh, kanë zbuluar Millosheviçin si një njeri që nuk ka pranuar pasojat e veprimeve të tij politike, duke mbrojtur në gjykatë pikëpamjet që e kishin shtyrë të përfshihej në konflikte, retorika e tij kundërshtonte kategorikisht çdo akuzë që i drejtohej atij, ku sipas të njëjtit qeniet njerëzore janë të paafta për të kryer mizori të tilla të liga për të cilat akuzohej ai. Pra, Millosheviçi kishte vazhduar të bënte “luftë” kundër jurisë në Tribunal, përkundër dëshmimeve të dëshmitarëve dhe provave të forta e pothuajse të pakontestueshme të paraqitura në seancat gjyqësore. Gjithsesi, ai nga Serbia dhe serbët, por edhe nga qarqe të caktuara të botës akademike ndërkom-bëtare, është konsideruar një simbol i rezistencës, njeri me inteligjencë eprorë, dhe si një avokat vetëmbrojtës që arriti të shfaqë mençuri dhe shkëlqim juridik të një burrë shteti.

Tromp në libër na ofron një perspektivë historike dhe të detajuar duke u bazuar në tri tema kryesore: udhëheqësinë, ideologjinë dhe planin. Përmes *udhëheqësisë*, na përshkruan kulturën politike të Serbisë, që në atë kohë mbështetej në udhëheqje të fuqishme nga ana e Millosheviçit, me pushtet *de jure* dhe *de facto*, rrugëtimin e Millosheviçit nga një politikan i rëndomtë, në një faktor destabilizues politik në strukturat e ish –Jugosllavisë, e deri në një personalitet që do të jetë në gjendje të kryejë masakrat më të mëdha historike pas Luftës së Dytë Botërore. Ndërsa, *ideologjia* shtetërore serbe që nga koha në pushtet e Millosheviçit, kishte pasur prioritet konceptin “Serbia e Madhe” dhe objektivin “Të gjithë serbët në një shtet të vetëm”. Madje, theksohet që në disa procesverbale të procedurës gjyqësore ka pasur të siguruar dhe material të bollshëm për natyrën e ideologjisë së miratuar nga Millosheviçi, si një variant i ideologjisë shtetërore serbe. Ai ka favorizuar formimin e një shteti që përfshinte të gjithë serbët, të cilët ishin të shpërndarë në territorin e ish-Jugosllavisë. Pra, Millosheviçi ka qenë përkrahës i ideologjisë së nacionalizmit serb, një projekt shtetëror ky me planifikim të përpiktë ku zbatimi i saj në mënyrë të pashmangshme, do të çonte në kryerjen e mizorive masive kundër joserbëve. Nëpërmjet ekzaminimit të procesverbaleve gjyqësore, kanë qenë të siguruar prova se si të gjitha planet politike të Millosheviçit vinin nga përpjekja e tij për të krijuar një shtet që do të përfshinte vetëm serbët, dhe se përpjekjet për të arritur këtë zgjerim do të ishin të pamëshirshme. Teza të cilën Tromp e paraqet në libër është se ideja e bashkimit të të gjithë serbëve në një shtet të vetëm nuk ka filluar dhe nuk përfundon me Millosheviçin. Ai vetëm ka vijuar përpjekjet për një ideologji të krijuar më

herët, dhe se kjo ideologji pas epokës millosheviçiane ka ndryshuar formë, ku më nuk flitet për Serbinë “e madhe” por për “rregullimin e kufijve”.

Libri paraqet edhe përshkrimin e historisë traumatike edukativo-familjare të Slobodan Millosheviçit, që nga fëmijëria e tij, i shoqëruar me tragjedi të përmasave tejet shqetësuese, dhe në anën tjetër, ekspozimin e bindjeve komuniste të familjes së tij. Procesin traumatik edukativo-familjar gjatë zhvillimit të tij si personalitet, libri e trajton si pretendime për baza të forta ndikuese të këtyre faktorëve në rritjen e një Slobodan Millosheviçi me karakter destruktiv. Ndërkohë, ekspozimi i bindjeve komuniste të rrethit familjar paracaktonin në mënyrë të theksuar rrugëtimin politik të tij në të ardhmen.

Një theks i veçantë trajtimi i dedikohet edhe rolit të gruas së Slobodan Millosheviçit, Mira Markoviç, si një intelektuale dhe politikane, e cila paraqet një ndër personat që ka pasur ndikim absolut në orientimin dhe strukturimin e çdo veprimi që Millosheviçi duhej të ndërmernte. Pozita këshilluese e gruas së tij, por në të njëjtën kohë mbështetja dhe qëndrimi qortues kohë pas kohe, ka qenë e pakufizuar dhe jashtë çdo përmase të parashikueshme dhe racionale, duke mos u kursyer edhe në dhënien e këshillave të tilla se “pushteti duhej të mbrohej edhe me gjak”. Ajo ka vijuar mbështetjen e palëkundur për veprimet kriminale të tij, shumë fuqishëm edhe gjatë procesit që është zhvilluar gjykimi në Tribunal, deri në momentin kur i pamundësohet komunikimi me Millosheviçin, për arsye të shpërnguljes në Rusi nga rreziku i ndjekjes penale në Serbi.

Përshkrimi i paraqitur në libër na frymëzon për të njohur të vërtetën e një drejtësie të mohuar përmes një kapitali voluminoz të provave të shkruara, verbale si dhe dokumenteve të ndryshme që kanë qenë pjesë e procedurës gjyqësore. Nga perspektiva e Tromp, burimi i vërtetë i historisë që formëson narrativën e konfliktit, nëse Slobodan Millosheviçi kishte zbatuar plan kriminal gjatë udhëheqësisë së tij, janë qëndrimi dhe sjellja e paqëndrueshme e tij gjatë seancave gjyqësore, dhe mospërputhja e tyre me provat e paraqitura në gjykatë. Në këtë drejtim, Tromp paraqet një analizë gjithëpërfshirëse të procesverbaleve të seancave gjyqësore të gjykimit kundër Slobodan Millosheviçit në Tribunalin Penal Ndërkombëtar për ish-Jugosllavinë. Autorja ngërthen shqyrtimin e tri aktakuzave që Millosheviçi gjykohej për gjenocid: aktakuza e Kroacisë; aktakuza e Bosnjë dhe Hercegovinës; aktakuza e Kosovës.

Nga ajo që Slobodan Millosheviçi me profesion ka qenë jurist, ka shfrytëzuar mundësinë që të vetëpërfaqësohet në gjykimin kundër tij. Influenca e tij ndaj anëtarëve të Tribu-

nalit paraqitet interesante, ku ai shfrytëzon të gjitha zbrazëtirat juridike për zvarritjen e procedurës. Tërthorazi, autorja shpreh se Tribunali ka treguar qëndrim tolerues ndaj taktikave manipuluese të Millosheviçit për ta përfaqësuar vetveten, pasi që përgatitja e të gjitha materialeve të nevojshme gjatë procedurës ka qenë dukshëm e pamundur nga vetë ai, duke pasur parasysh gjendjen e rënduar shëndetësore të Millosheviçit që nga fillimi i gjykimit dhe përkeqësimet e vazhdueshme shëndetësore, të cilat çonin në vijimësi anulimin e seancave gjyqësore, dhe me këtë edhe zvarritjen e procedurës. Ky element i zvarritjes është i një rëndësie të jashtëzakonshme, pasi që autorja, sërish tërthorazi, komunikon se është një ndër faktorët kyç që procedura gjyqësore ndaj Millosheviçit nuk përfundoi. Nga ana tjetër, kësaj situatë i ndihmoi edhe qëndrimi i vetë shtetit serb, duke nguruar në dhënien e dokumenteve të kërkuara nga arkivi i Serbisë lidhur me Millosheviçin.

Procesi familjar, profesional dhe politik është i elaboruar me fakte dhe prova të forta, nga vetë fakti që opinionit publik të njëjtat i shfaqen nga një autoritet që ka pasur qasje dhe e njeh në thellësi çdo detaj që ka të bëjë me gjykimin e Millosheviçit. Megjithatë, procesi gjyqësor i Millosheviçit mbeti pa një epilog dhe aktgjykim pasi kemi vdekjen e tij. Pas vdekjes së Millosheviçit e menjëhershme ishte ndërprerja e procesit gjyqësor kundër tij, që nënkupton se akuzat kundër tij mbetën të pa gjykuara, e kjo ndodhi si pasojë e mungesës së vullnetit të Tribunalit. Nga gjithë demonstrimi vërehet se çështja e Sllobodan Millosheviçit kishte arritur deri në gjykim, duke u mbështetur në dëshmi, dokumentarë, video, audio incizime, të gjitha këto të paraqitura në prova, pra me akuza adekuate dhe jo dyshime apo indicie të mundshme, që nënkupton se çdo hetues dhe gjykues për të gjitha provat që kanë përfaqësuar krime është dashur t'i marrin në konsideratë duke i shqyrtuar dhe gjykuar të njëjtat.

Libri paraqitet burim historik me vlerë të madhe që iu mundëson gjeneratave të reja të njihen me një periudhë dhe figurë shumë komplekse të Ballkanit, si dhe në të njëjtën kohë libri paraqet një procedurë gjyqësore të transformuar në një punim hulumtues. Qëllimi i librit është që një pasuri e këtillë e provave të fuqishme mos të ngelë vetëm në arkivin e Tribunalit, por të bëhet e njohur për publikun në mbarë botën.

Hana Younis *To Be a Qadi in Cristian Empire: The Work and Staff of Sharia Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina Between 1878-1914*

University of Sarajevo - Institute of History, 2021, 439 pages

Reviewer: Dženita Sarač-Rujanac

Known for its exceptional publishing activities, the University of Sarajevo Institute of History's 21st edition of *Historijske Monografije* [Historical Monograph] published a book by Dr. Hana Younis, a senior research associate. This is the fifth book from the author, who for almost 20 years has been studying the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the last decades of the Ottoman rule and the Austro-Hungarian period, with a special focus on social and everyday-life history. Significantly exceeding the previous interests of historical science by bringing a view from below, she has focused her numerous works on the lives of the "little people" whose destinies are visibly influenced by all key sociopolitical processes of the long and turbulent 19th century.

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Opting for the so-called rights in reality approach, as pointed out by the reviewer Dr. Fikret Karčić, Dr. Younis follows the latest research trends and brings to the public a useful study on the history of Qadis and Sharia law in the Sarajevo region from 1878 until the beginning of the First World War by applying a combination of methods such as comparative, statistical, and analytical.

In addition to the Preface and Introduction, the book contains four key chapters divided into a number of subchapters, as well as a Conclusion written in Bosnian, Arabic, and English. The end of the book contains lists of the cited sources and literature, the presented articles, tables, documents, photographs, and indexes of personal names and geographical terms, as well as a list of abbreviations and the author's biography. Particularly noteworthy are the selected and presented archives, documents from the Sharia courts, facsimiles of the Sharia court stamps (with inscriptions in Latin and Arabic and the coats of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), signatures and seals of Qadis, their photographs, partial personnel files, as well as various applications, decisions, reports, medical findings, death certificates, powers of attorney, permits, statements, spy reports, and tabular annual reports from the Sharia courts (48 in 1878 and 53 in 1913). These annual Main Statements on the operation of county offices as Sharia courts offer valuable information about the work of the courts and about those on whom that work depended: their conceptual and clerical staff. Also, the author tabulates and compares the number of judges of district courts, stating their salaries, years of service, and years of birth. The appendices present plans for the construction of district courts in Bileća (1903), Mostar (1906), and Trebinje (1907), the premises in which the Sharia courts were to be located. Also, based on individual annual reports, key information is stated regarding the work of Sharia courts in Cazin and Trebinje for the years 1885-1907, 1911, and 1913.

The first chapter is titled "Sharia Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads of Empires" (pp. 23-73), in which the author looks at the Sharia legal system and customary law in the Ottoman Empire, which included the Bosnian Eyalet, in order to better understand a key topic. The comprehensive changes to the legal system in this Empire (i.e., its Europeanization at the beginning of the 19th century) meant the incorporation of Western legislation, especially the provisions that were in force in France. In 1839, the Edict of Gülhane divided the courts into civil and Sharia, and the *Mecelle* (Ottoman Civil Code) was soon published. The Eyalet Constitution of 1865 established a

civil and commercial court in Sarajevo. In addition to the Qadis, the civil courts had six jurors (three Muslims and three non-Muslims), and appellate courts were formed. Such a legal system in an accelerated transformation was founded by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1878, which immediately upon arrival issued a series of orders aimed at bridging the existing legal system with the one in the Monarchy. County, district, and supreme civil and Sharia courts were formed, while more specific regulations from Austro-Hungarian legislation began being applied after 1882. During the first years of the occupation, the Sharia courts continued their work without any significant changes, only to become part of the district courts in 1883 and receiving the official name of the district Sharia courts in 1906.

Without going deeper into the analysis of the legal framework, the author focuses on the work of Sharia courts in practice, questions about where they were established and how they were organized, where they were located, what their scope of work was, what the courtroom looked like, and so on. In addition, the author focuses on the staff of Sharia courts; their work, obligations, and duties; position in society; and participation in political movements by bringing information about their private lives significantly conditioned by the position they held.

Qadis, clerks, and in some places support staff worked in inadequate, restricted, and often rented premises. They also performed their duties outside the court premises. With the special permission of the district judge, a qadi would go to visit certain places or individual parties according to an established plan. As an educated and respectable class whose influence and attitudes could change the mood of the wider masses, Qadis were under constant scrutiny and surveillance by the authorities. During the first years after the occupation, the pressure on the Qadis was extreme. By the end of 1880, a large number of employees of Sharia courts, especially those marked as old-fashioned or as Turkish officials were replaced. The new government encouraged their departure by providing them with travel expenses (in the amount of a three-month salary), but also applied other, more drastic methods, securing positions for those considered more loyal.

By analyzing the existing documents, the author reconstructs the attitude of the authorities toward the sharia courts and their officials, especially after the appointment of the *Reisu-l-Ulema* [Grand Mufti] and the establishment of the Majlis of the Ulama in

1882. The first years after the occupation were a period of public silence, during which the new government sought to maintain the image that it would not interfere with the competencies and powers of the sultan and shaykh al-Islam in the domain of the sharia judiciary. However, the game of neutrality was soon over. With a carefully planned propaganda but also with specific legal regulations and restrictions, the government tried to limit and completely control the Sharia courts, leaving their jurisdiction exclusively for the Muslim population and only in certain legal segments. The Order on the Establishment and Scope of Sharia Courts as adopted in August 1883 (7220 / II) regulated their status and the position of Qadis as state officials of the Monarchy. The continuity of work should not have been questioned, but the new government sought to separate the entire religious hierarchy from the Ottoman state and assume its right to appoint religious officials. The Qadis were nominated by the *Reisu-l-Ulema* in the following period, and finally appointed by the Provincial Government where, in addition to compulsory education and the necessary diplomas and certificates of service, the decisive criterion was their suitability (i.e., loyalty to the Monarchy). The attitude they had exhibited during the struggle for religious and educational autonomy came under particular scrutiny. It was an extremely difficult situation, which the author points out as, “a double-edged sword; open support meant the loss of the job and livelihood of the whole family, and keeping aside meant the anger and contempt of Muslims to whom they administered justice on a daily basis.” It was similar in the period when political parties formed. In addition, some Qadis publicly expressed their opinions and views, which often meant increased pressure, additional checks, investigations, disciplinary proceedings, penalties, dismissals, or retirement. At the same time, the staff of the Sharia courts as well as the students of the Sharia Judicial School were limited in terms of the space for cultural activities, with the opening of *kiraethane* [reading rooms] being an exception.

The existence of Sharia, civil, and commercial courts without clear competencies and intertwined jurisdictions created a confusion with which the ordinary population found difficult to cope. In the second chapter titled “Work of Sharia Courts” (pp. 73–129), the author follows the gradual but clearly directed process of suppressing Sharia law. Quite influential were the Orders of the Provincial Government no. 436 (enacted December 30, 1878); the Decree of July 17, 1878 no. 1390; the Imperial Decree of 1881 on the Appointment, Dismissal, and Transfer of Staff of Sharia Courts; as well as the Order of

the Provincial Government dated May 1, 1883 on the Organization and Scope of Sharia Courts. Sharia courts thus remained competent for family relations, marriages, divorces, children's rights and duties, inheritance rights, issues of mental capacity, prodigality and retardation, tutelage and curate cases. It was an extremely narrow range, and thus officials as well as the population sent requests to the higher courts and the Provincial Government on numerous issues. The need to reform the existing system was discussed by the provincial government with representatives from the Executive Committee of the Muslim People's Organization, the Ulema Majlis, the Supreme Sharia Court, and the Sharia Judicial School. However, the diplomatic responses of the authorities as well as the extension of the Qadis' powers to certain issues based on legacies, moral powers, and the legalization of signatures (1906) were a reflection of the unquestionable intention to reduce the jurisdiction of Sharia courts with the appearance of having kindness and support for continuing the work.

In addition, the author points out the discrepancy between the existing legal framework and practice, using a number of examples reconstructed from the original archives to indicate what authority the qadis actually had. Qadis also had power over the domain of the private issues that were left to them and limited by special delegated provisions such as the *soldačke zapreke* [soldiers' barrier]. In particular, issues of immorality and issues related to children born out of wedlock, divorce, and the like were sensitive due to significantly different interpretations between the Sharia and civil courts. The author singles out the important issue of inheritance, where certain inheritance lawsuits often appear to have been occurring between these two courts for years. At the same time, the importance of property disputes and bequests as well as money, the practice of lending it to officials and servants, and orders to deposit it in the Privileged Land Bank (beginning in 1895) is evidenced by the fact that Sharia courts were required to inform district courts in detail about these issues. Statements were submitted to the provincial government in the form of semi-annual reports regarding bequests (in August), and the same was true of taxes and deposits, waqf money (as of 1902), and detailed reports regarding the deceased.

The author also references the language (i.e., the alphabet of the documents of the Sharia courts). They originated immediately in the years after the occupation and were written exclusively in Arabic script in the Ottoman language. However, a gradual change occurred, especially after the generation of Qadis who'd been educated in

Sarajevo at the Sharia Judicial School founded in 1887. At the beginning of 1882, the provincial government issued an order to use the Arabic language “as needed,” and the following year ordered all documents written in Turkish to be translated into the native language. This issue was sought to be more clearly defined by the provisions of 1896, 1897 and 1908, with the official language of the Sharia courts becoming Bosnian while decisions could be issued in Turkish. The author points out how the material testifies to the fact that the Qadis, familiar with both scripts, still mostly used the Arabic alphabet and preferred it in personal seals.

In the third chapter titled “Sharia Courts Through Figures (pp. 129–241), the author points out the content and importance of annual reports (i.e., the statements from Sharia courts since 1886 when the special decree on regulation and form of writing statements required all courts to submit to the Supreme Sharia Court). These data were included in the Main Business Statements of the District Offices as Sharia Courts and submitted to the Provincial Government for inspection and verification. The reports had the following permanent columns: 1) Place of the district as a sharia court, 2) Number of submissions, 3) Litigation, 4) Probate hearings, 5) Weddings, 6) Divorces, 7) Decision of the Supreme Court regarding litigation, 8) Decision of the Supreme Court regarding other things, and 9) Names of conceptual and clerical staff. The book presents the Main Business Statements of the District Offices as Sharia Courts for the years 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1911 and 1913. As a specific and important source, and with its errors, corrections, and deletions, the statements speak about the existing historical context. They testify to the position and work of the courts, their competencies, and their efficiency and reveal a part of the everyday life of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the important obligations and concerns they tried to address.

The last chapter, titled “Sharia Court Staff: Qadis, Trainees, Scribes” (pp. 245–359) is entirely devoted to the Sharia Court staff of Qadis, trainees, practitioners, scribes, Land Registry Officers, and in some courts Deputy Qadis and Secretaries. Analyzing the available archives, the author writes about their obligations and rights, preconditions and manner of employment, working conditions, income and status, retirement, the right to inherit a pension, the right to vacation, frequent transfers, field work, and the like. Dr. Younis points out that the Qadis were extremely educated. Their education lasted 14-16 years and often occurred in various centers of the Ottoman Empire, thus

gaining the necessary knowledge of the real sciences as well as Arabic, Turkish, Bosnian, and often Persian. Relying on direct sources, the author confronts this data with the current position in contemporary historiography on the unsatisfactory “human capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the eve of annexation,” or in other words, “a very thin layer of well-educated people.” We learn about their private lives from obligatory reports on marriage, birth of children, death of close family members, and other similar issues that significantly illuminate the everyday life of that time.

However, the position of a Qadi differed significantly from that of a district court judge. The author confirms this by the fact that the Qadis, despite their years of service, belonged to the lowest pay grades (generally between 6-10, and mostly 9 or 10, which are the lowest). She also points to a very intriguing difference in the text of the oath which both civil and Sharia judges were required to take. While the trainees of the district court swore that they would do the job conscientiously and honestly, those engaged in Sharia courts had to first swear that they would be submissive and loyal to the emperor and would not give or support any “foreign or domestic, secret or public society, which supports political purposes.” The oath became standard just prior to the annexation.

At the same time, the battle to regulate their status and regular and even minimal compensation had been waged by other Sharia court staff for years. In numerous requests, Qadis stated the key motives for addressing these points, underlined their competencies and work experience, while also writing about their personal lives and the difficulties they encountered due to lack of income. However, the Austro-Hungarian administration did not significantly change its attitude towards them. The author concludes that many years of unpaid work and general uncertainty related to promotion and official engagement resulted, with the undoubted intention being to keep the position and function of Sharia court officials unprofitable and to make them insecure and therefore undesirable.

Not until 1886 did the Joint Ministry of Finance upon repeated requests issue a statement saying that “without any doubt,” the staff of Sharia courts was also entitled to a pension. However, this again referred exclusively to the Qadis and their families, who usually only after persistent efforts managed to exercise this right.

The work of Qadis and Sharia clerks, as well as their movements during the holidays, were constantly monitored by the district judges, who would write annual reports

on the work of Qadis and forward them to the Provincial Government, as well as by branched spy networks and also the public, which strictly followed their every step. Higher positions would receive signed or anonymous complaints and lawsuits which would then initiate disciplinary proceedings, checks, and investigations against Qadis, even resulting in oral and written punishments, reprimands, or dismissals. The punishment of judicial officers was regulated by special regulations in July 1907, and criminal and disciplinary proceedings were important issues during the 1911 judicial reform. Complaints and grievances, often obvious defamation, were also published in the press such as in *Musavat* and *Srpstvo* as a suitable means of settling scores with political dissidents. Some complaints were truly justified. Defendants would invoke their reputation and unquestionable honor if the disputed act was not public (e.g., drinking alcohol, playing cards) and not of particular concern to the authorities or had no legal consequences.

In order to better regulate and improve its status, the Association of Sharia Court Staff was organized in Sarajevo a few months before the outbreak of the First World War. Previously, the Association of Judges of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been organized and did not include the Qadis. This only confirms the previous attitudes of the authorities toward the Sharia courts, indicating a relationship between colleagues where the qadis, as the author concludes, were neither desirable nor equal. The special value of this book is the list of Qadis (i.e., the more complete list of the Staff of Sharia courts in the Austro-Hungarian period presented in Chapter 4). Based on information from the materials available in the Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Historical Archive of Sarajevo, the Archives of Tuzla Canton, the Archives of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and the Gazi Husrev-beg Library, as well as in newspapers, magazines, and yearbooks, the author states the names of all those who'd been mentioned as Sharia courts employees between 1878-1914. It lists as many as 388 people in alphabetical order, the place of their service, as well as other valuable information such as age at retirement, date of death, relocation, and other engagements.

This testifies that the Sharia courts and its staff were very much a subject of political interest to the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Legislation and the establishment of new institutions were aimed at subordinating this important system, as well as gradually suppressing it, minimizing its significance and reputation, and eventually extinguishing it. Affiliated with the district courts, subordinate to the

civil judges, with significantly limited powers and competencies intertwined with the civil judiciary, and with extremely low incomes, the Qadis continued their work, but it was clearly a mere struggle for survival. Such Sharia courts could hardly provide the expected security to a population that found itself “between two kingdoms, two religions and two laws” The Movement for Religious and Educational Autonomy and the Organization of Muslim Parties held special exams for the staff of Sharia courts. They were in an unenviable position, torn between different political options and responsibilities as an educated and respectable class toward their own people while at the same time being strictly controlled based on the current monarchist government. Many reasons had encouraged the Qadis to be the initiators of their departure to a “permanent state of peace”. Through archival material, Dr. Younis not only points out the individual fates of Sharia court staff but further reveals the spirit of turbulent times and the burdens in a border area such as Bosnia.

The author should rightly be congratulated on this book that is based on hitherto unpublished and mostly unused archival material which, although difficult to access, partial, and dispersed into various funds, is a valuable historical resource due to the multitude of valuable data. In this first monograph on Sharia courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian rule, a lot of effort and patience has been made evident. Due to the importance of this long-neglected topic in historical science, we hope that this book will soon be supplemented and enriched with new research findings.

Katrin Bozeva-Abazi, Trajtësimi i identiteteve kombëtare bullgare dhe serbe: 1800-1900

Logos-A, Shkup-Prishtinë-Tiranë, 2022, fq. 304

Reviewer: Ali Pajaziti

“Miti dhe krijimi i miteve ende janë kuti me të cilin çdo shoqëri ballkanike mat ndërgjegjen e saj kombëtare.”

André Gerolymatos

Identiteti, si një term i studiuar nga psiko-analistët, sociologët dhe social-psikologët, përfaqëson veçoritë kryesore të individit (*personal identity*) ose të një grupi të njerëzve (*collective identity*), me të cilat mund të dallohet një njeri ose një kolektivitet. Këtë kategori shoqërisht të konstruktuar Fukuyama (2018) e ka quajtur kërkesë për dinjitet.

Identiteti social është skemë konjitive (Wendt, 1994), dëshirë për dallim, nder dhe pozicion grupor brenda diskurseve specifike historike (Herrigel, 1993), kurse ai kombëtar përfshin një kuptim të vazhdimësisë kohore dhe hapësinore të aksh kombit. Duhet

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cekur se identiteti luan rol qendror në punimet mbi nacionalizmin dhe konfliktin etnik (Horowitz 1985, në Fearon, 1999).

Trajtësimi i identiteteve kombëtare bullgare dhe serbe 1800-1900 i Katrin Bozeva-Abazit, nga Universiteti McGill (Montreal, 2003), disertacion doktorate i mbrojtur në këtë institucion prestigjioz, përbën një vepër të rëndësishme shkencore, që zbërthen kombndërtimin ballkanik, një diadë nacionalizmesh, kursin dhe procesin e krijimit të dy kombeve konkurrenente të kësaj hapësire turbulente, “konfliktin midis bullgarëve dhe serbëve si vazhdimësi e betejës së shekullit të trembëdhjetë për hegjemoninë territoriale dhe politike në Ballkan” (Stanojević). Në të, përmes një metodologjie shumëpërmasore dhe objektivitet akademik, autorja kërkon rrënjët e mobilizimit etno-nacionalist në Ballkanin e shekullit të nëntëmbëdhjetë, në këtë gjeografi që është sinonim i kthimit në gjendje fisnore, të prapambetur, primitive dhe barbare (Todorova). Teza e saj konsiston në pohimin se, deri në krijimin e shtetit, shumica e bullgarëve dhe serbëve nuk ishin të ndërgjegjshëm për përkatësinë në një komunitet kombëtar, se konservatorizmi fshatar dhe historicizmi ortodoks kanë qenë dy elementet determinuese të ndërtimit të këtyre dy identiteteve. “Deri në vitet 1890 shumica dërrmuese e popullit, si në Serbi ashtu edhe në Bullgari, ishin politikisht injorantë dhe nuk shprehin asnjë interesim për të drejtat e tyre kushtetuese dhe civile.” – rrëfen ajo

I ndarë në gjashtë kapituj (“Si u krijua nacionalizmi ‘popullor’”, “Shpikja e shtetit modern ballkanik: Serbia dhe Bullgaria, 1830-1914”, “Kisha dhe indoktrinimi kombëtar”, “Ushtria Kombëtare, 1830-1914”, “Arsimi dhe indoktrinimi kombëtar”), libri – në mënyrë elokuyente – e shkoqit procesin e ndërgjegjësimit ose indoktrinimit kombëtar tek serbët dhe bullgarët, forcë motorike e të cilit ka qenë shteti. “Bullgarët dhe serbët e zakonshëm kishin pak njohuri për agjendat kombëtare dhe, deri në ndërhyrjen e shteteve të tyre, shumë pak interesoheshin për tjetër gjë, përveç bukës dhe mirëqenies së familjeve të tyre.” Në këtë drejtim ajo thekson se krijimi i identitetit serb dhe bullgar është bazuar tek popullata rurale dhe e krishterë, e cila ka qenë kryesisht analfabete (80 deri në 90%; gazeta *Srpske Novine* në vitin e parë të botimit ka pasur 120 abonentë në tre milionë banorë; më 1832 në të gjithë Serbinë ka pasur vetëm 36 shkolla dhe 40 mësues; më 1930, në Bullgari 58 % e burrave dhe 89% e grave s’dinin shkrim dhe lexim). Pra, shovinizmi ose *mallkimi fshatarak* (Nairn) përbën zanafillën e nacionalizmit të tërbuar serbo-bullgar. Sipas autores, arsimimi masiv ka qenë një zhvillim vendimtar, por me peshë të njëjtë ishte edhe luajtja në telin “patriotik” të mitologjisë popullore të

promovuar sërish nga shteti. Një pjesë e nacionalizmit ishte ndërtimi i identitetit bullgar dhe serb si *kundër-turk* dhe *kundër-mysliman*: në kapërcyell të shekullit të njëzetë, rekrutët bullgarë praktikonin stërvitje të qitjeve mbi objektiva të palëvizshme të mbuluara me kapelë tradicionale turke, *fes*. Feja e krishterë ortodokse ka qenë një amalgamë e identitetit; ndërkohë si agjent diferencues veçohej *tjetri religjioz*. Identiteti i këtyre kombeve para formimit të shteteve moderne ballkanike ka qenë thjesht fetar dhe jo “kombëtar në përmbajtje dhe shprehje” (Kitromilides, 1994). Mobilizuesit e parë të inteligjencës vendase bullgare dhe serbe ishin ose murgj, që shkruanin përmbledhjet e para romantike të historive vendase (Paisij dhe Dositej Obradović në shekullin e tetëmbëdhjetë), ose gjuhëtarë autodidaktë, që modernizuan gjuhën e shkruar bullgare dhe serbe mbi bazën e të folmes bisedore, si Petër Beron dhe Vuk Karadžić në shekullin e nëntëmbëdhjetë. Shkurt, edhe bullgarët, edhe serbët e kanë ndërtuar nacionalizmin mbi mite dhe e kanë nxitur te fshatarësia përmes zellit fetar dhe idesë së tjetrit.

Ky libër, që partikularisht flet edhe për ne, duhet lexuar me qasje krahasimtare rreth kontekstit dhe proceseve të kombndërtimit-kombëtarizmit shqiptarë të periudhës gjegjëse, me theks të veçantë në qëmtimin në hartën e ndryshimeve të kohës në “Maqedoninë osmane”. Në të ka shumë leksione për ne shqiptarët si komb në fërkim permanent me etnocentrizmin dhe megalomaninë serbe më shumë se një shekull, por edhe lidhur me bullgarizmin si ideologji dhe me aktorët e tjerë të siudhësës ballkanike. Libri i Bozeva-Abazit, përveç pjesës cilësore, është i pajisur edhe me të dhëna kuantitative, edhe me tabela që në mënyrë ekkzakte ilustron rrjedhat historike. Ai është kundërteze e shkrimit ideologjik të historisë. “Historianët duhet të argumentojnë nga provat dhe jo nga supozimet ose spekulimet.”, thotë autorja.

Kjo vepër, e botuar në anglisht nga Instituti i Historisë Nacionale në Shkup (2007), mund t’u hyjë në punë sociologëve dhe historianëve, por gjithashtu edhe politologëve, antropologëve, studentëve dhe studiuesve të shkencave sociale, para së gjithash atyre që merren me çështjen e identitetit, nacionalizmit, Ballkanit dhe relacionin kombi-feja. Sugjerojmë që leximi i kësaj vepre të bëhet bashkë me *Turku imagjinar* të Bozhdar Jezernikut (2017), *Unë dhe tjetri* të Zagorka Golluboviqit (2019) dhe *Filozofia e palangës* të Radomir Konstantinoviçit, që së shpejti pritet të dalë nga “fabrika e librit cilësor”, Logos-A. Një lëvdatë publike meriton përkthyesi, Urim Poshka, i cili ka bërë një shqipërim besnik dhe lehtë të kuptueshëm të kësaj vepre.

